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Kentucky River at the
Intersection of Professional
and Supervisory Status:
Fertile Delta or Bermuda
Triangle?
Introduction
On January 27, 1997, the Kentucky State District Council of Carpenters, AFL–CIO, petitioned Region Nine of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for a representation election at the Caney Creek
Rehabilitation Complex. Caney Creek was a psychiatric rehabilitation
facility, owned and operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.
(KRCC), a non-profit organization. The union sought to represent all
employees except guards, clerical and administrative employees, and
supervisors, who are excluded by § 2(11) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) from its protections.1 The union’s most important strategic
consideration was to ensure that the rehabilitation counselors, borderline professional employees, were included in the bargaining unit. These
workers strongly supported the unionization effort. Rehabilitation counselor Glenn Moore was doing the lion’s share of organizing the workplace from within.2 In the union’s view, the rehabilitation counselors and
1

Petition, Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., NLRB Case No. 9–RC–16837.

2 The description in this chapter of the union’s perspective is based on a telephone
interview with Carpenters Union counsel Thomas J. Schulz, October 1, 2004 and a
telephone interview with Carpenters Union Supreme Court counsel, AFL–CIO Associate
General Counsel Craig Becker, December 17, 2004. The description of AFL–CIO advocacy
from the mid–1990’s onwards is based on the telephone interview with Becker, as well as a
telephone interview with AFL–CIO Associate General Counsel Jim Coppess, December 17,
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nurses working at Caney Creek were non-supervisory professional employees whose right to join unions is explicitly protected by § 2(12) of the
NLRA.
There were three strategic prongs to the employer’s response, two
legal and one practical: (1) try to avoid having any election at all by
claiming to be exempt from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA);
(2) try to exclude as many workers as possible from the bargaining unit,
particularly pro-union voters such as Glenn Moore and his rehabilitation
counselor coworkers, by claiming that they were supervisors; (3) try to
defeat the union in the election. Initially, KRCC failed on all three
fronts. Following established NLRB case law, the Regional Director ruled
against all of KRCC’s arguments. The union won an overwhelming
victory at the polls, even though the employer fired Moore and other
union activists during the campaign.
The Sixth Circuit, however, in which KRCC was located, had harshly criticized NLRB formulations of the fundamental distinction between
non-supervisory health care professionals and supervisors holding professional credentials who exercise significant discretion and authority over
subordinates in personnel matters. Nevertheless, in the appellate court,
the employer only prevailed to the extent of excluding the six registered
nurses (RNs) from the overall bargaining unit. KRCC was unable to
overturn the certification as to the other ninety-five percent of the
workforce. The union would have happily declared victory, and begun
bargaining. The employer would have accepted its modest partial victory,
and pursued passive resistance at the bargaining table. Exclusion of six
RNs from a 100 employee unit was not critical to either side. The NLRB
petitioned for certiorari, despite the risk of an adverse outcome. However, the NLRB lost the case and did not get the legal clarity it sought.
Rather, in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, the Supreme
Court rejected the Board’s rule that professionals are not supervisors if
the only form of authority they exercise is to use judgment based on
their professional training in directing less skilled coworkers in the
delivery of services, pursuant to standards set by the employer. Although
the Court rejected the NLRB’s rule, it did not articulate one of its own
and did little to clarify the very uncertain line between professional
2004. The description of the employer’s perspective is based upon telephone interviews
with Kentucky River’s lawyers, George J. Miller on December 17, 2004, and Michael W.
Hawkins on January 13, 2005. The description of the NLRB’s perspective is based on a
telephone interview with former General Counsel Fred Feinstein, December 16, 2004; a
telephone interview with former General Counsel Leonard R. Page, February 16, 2004; an
interview with former Member Sarah M. Fox in Silver Spring, Maryland, August 28, 2004;
a telephone interview with former Member Fox, December 17, 2004; an interview with
former Member John E. Higgins, Jr. in Silver Spring, Maryland, August 28, 2004; and a
telephone interview with Associate General Counsel John H. Ferguson, December 17, 2004.
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employees who provide some direction to non-professional subordinates,
and supervisors who are also professionals.3
This chapter will tell the story of how the Supreme Court arrived at
its construction of § 2(11) in a ruling which opened up as many questions as it resolved, on the basis of facts barely related to the adjudicated
legal issues. It will consider future interpretation of § 2(11) and the
Kentucky River decision’s impact upon the broad structure of organizing
and bargaining under the NLRA. It also will describe the NLRB’s clear
victory on the question of the burden of proof. This sleeper issue, to
which other litigants paid little attention, may have significant consequences for all of the exclusions from NLRA coverage.
Social and Legal Background
Kentucky River merged two streams of social and legal history: the
branch differentiating between rank and file and supervisory workers,
and the tributary on NLRA applicability to the health care industry.
This chapter next will review the antecedents of today’s issues, first, in
the Wagner Act treatment of craft and industrial supervisors, next, in
the adoption of the Taft–Hartley amendments, and then, in the checkered sequence of NLRA coverage and exclusion of health care employers.
The two streams combined in a 1994 case about the supervisory status of
nursing home charge nurses, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.
of America (HCR), discussion of which will follow. HCR sets the stage for
Kentucky River, which will be considered thereafter.
THE BATTLE OVER UNIONIZATION

OF

SUPERVISORS

How § 2(11) Came To Be: (1) Wagner Act Treatment of Foremen’s
Unionization
Initially, the Wagner Act did not explicitly exempt supervisors from
the statutory definition of employees protected by the Act. The rise and
fall of unions of foremen is a fascinating story, which led directly to
enactment of the Taft–Hartley amendments that deprived supervisors of
the right to unionize while protecting the right of professionals to do so.4
The maritime, metal, building and printing trades of the American
3
4

NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).

This history of the treatment of supervisors prior to adoption of the Taft–Hartley Act
draws upon the following contemporary sources: Ernest Dale, The American Foreman
Unionizes, 19 J. Bus. U. Chi. 25 (Jan. 1946); Walter L. Daykin, The Status of Supervisory
Employees under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 297 (1944); David
Levinson, Foremen’s Unions and the Law, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 79; Herbert R. Northrup,
Unionization of Foremen, 21 Harv. Bus. Rev. 496 (1943); Russell A. Smith, Labor Law—
Some Developments During the Past Five Years (A Service for Returning Veterans), 44
Mich. L. Rev. 1089, 1109–12 (1946); Comment, Rights of Supervisory Employees to
Collective Bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, 55 Yale L.J. 754 (1946);
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Federation of Labor (AFL) had long included all members of the occupation, regardless of managerial level. This tradition continued after enactment of the 1935 Wagner Act. In the 1930’s and early 1940’s, the
recently-founded Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) organized
factory-wide ‘‘production and maintenance’’ units in mass production,
the growth sector of industry. Union membership quintupled from three
million to fifteen million between 1935 and 1947.5 As unions won
collective bargaining agreements improving wages and working conditions of factory workers, however, front-line supervisors found that their
own position had deteriorated compared to their subordinates. This led
in the early 1940’s to large-scale unionization by manufacturing foremen. Unionization threatened to shift the allegiance of foremen to the
working class, depriving employers of loyal front-line agents and potentially impairing operational efficiency. Manufacturing firms depended on
their foremen to enforce discipline and productivity in harsh, unsafe,
repetitive assembly line jobs. Union-based loyalty to the interests of the
workers could subvert the supervisor’s enforcement of policies aimed at
extracting increased productivity and discipline. Unionized foremen also
might strike with the rank and file, or honor their picket lines.
Under the Wagner Act, placement of supervisors in the NLRA
scheme arose in three different contexts: (1) whether a foreman’s antiunion conduct could be imputed to the employer for purposes of establishing employer liability for unfair labor practices (ULPs); (2) protection
of foremen as employees against employer anti-union discrimination; and
(3) foremen’s organizing and bargaining rights. Although the statutory
text has been amended, the problem of the treatment of supervisors
continues to arise today in each of these distinct settings. As a matter of
statutory construction, the Board had to decide whether the foremen fell
under the § 2(2) definition of ‘‘employer,’’ the § 2(3) definition of
‘‘employee,’’ or both at once, in each of the three contexts. The Wagner
Act definition of ‘‘employer’’ in § 2(2) expansively provided: ‘‘The term
‘employer’ includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly.’’ The § 2(3) definition of ‘‘employee’’ in the
Wagner Act was either extremely broad or else vague and was, in any
event, circular; it simply stated that: ‘‘The term ‘employee’ shall include
any employee.’’
Note, The Status of Supervisory Personnel under the NLRA, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 606 (1946);
Martin Bordon, Note, Labor Law: Right of Supervisory Employees to Bargain Collectively
Under Provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 34 Cal. L. Rev. 245 (1946); Edwin R.
Fischer, Note, Problem of the Propriety of a Foreman’s Union, 34 Geo. L.J. 89 (1946); Note,
Collective Bargaining By Supervisory Employees Under the Wagner Act, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev.
332 (1946). See also Joseph E. Moore, The National Labor Relations Board and Supervisors, 21 Lab. L.J. 195 (1970).
5 See, e.g., David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth
Century Struggle 157 (2d ed. 1993).
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Acts of first-level supervisors were consistently treated as binding
the employer for ULP purposes, so long as no issue of foremen’s
unionization was on the horizon.6 Thus, if a foreman made an anti-union
statement, the law would impute the statement to the employer, and the
employer might be liable for a ULP. When the foremen acted in their
own collective interests, however, or contrary to instructions from higher
management, and in the interests of rank and file workers, their actions
were not attributed to management under § 2(2). On the contrary, when
foremen claimed to be victims of employer discrimination based on their
own union activities, they were held to be protected as § 2(3) ‘‘employees.’’ The dual role theory prevailed:
There is no inconsistency [between Sections 2(2) and 2(3)]TTTT A
foreman, in his relation to his employer, is an employee, while in his
relation to the laborers under him he is the representative of the
employer and within the definition of Section 2(2) of the Act.
Nothing in the Act excepts foremen from its benefits nor from
protection against discrimination nor unfair labor practices of the
master.7
The clarity of the dual role approach, however, evaporated when it
came to determining collective bargaining units under § 9. In early cases
involving craft unions which had traditionally included supervisors, they
were deemed statutory ‘‘employees’’ entitled to organize. Absent such a
history, however, the Board excluded supervisors from bargaining units
of ordinary workers.8 The Board vacillated over certification of separate
units of foremen in manufacturing. In 1942, in Union Collieries Coal
Co.,9 the NLRB held that foremen were § 2(3) employees, with the right
to organize and bargain. Member Reilly dissented, stressing that unionized foremen could both deprive employees of the free choice of union
representative, either in the interest of the foremen themselves or in
their employer’s interest, and also deprive the company of the foremen’s
full loyalty in disciplining and supervising subordinates. Six months
later, in Maryland Drydock Co.,10 Member Reilly wrote for a new NLRB
majority, and held against further certification of foremen’s bargaining
units. Without resolving the question whether foremen were entirely
excluded from the definition of employee in § 2(3), the Board asserted
6 See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79–80 (1940); H.J. Heinz Co.
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 518–21 (1941); NLRB v. Link–Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 598–99
(1941).
7

NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F.2d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1940).

8 See Walter L. Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 297, 301, 311–13, 317–19 (1944) (collecting cases).
9

41 NLRB 961 (1942); 44 NLRB 165 (1942) (supp. op.).

10

49 NLRB 733 (1943).
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that it had wide discretion under § 9 to determine that an appropriate
bargaining unit could not include supervisors, except in industries where
pre-Wagner Act traditions supported unionization. For a brief period, the
Board attempted to hold that supervisors were ‘‘employees’’ protected
against anti-union reprisals by their employer but that they could not
unionize under § 9.11 However, it proved difficult to sustain the position
that foremen were full-fledged ‘‘employees’’ against whom ULP violations of §§ 8(1), 8(3), and 8(4) could be committed, yet they had no § 7
rights to organize under NLRB § 9 auspices, and employers could not
violate § 8(5) by refusing to bargain with foremen’s unions. Shortly
thereafter, in Packard Motor Car Co.,12 one Board member reversed his
position, and the Board restored the right of low-level supervisors to
organize in a separate unit.
Mass production employers did not acquiesce in the new approach.
Packard itself refused to comply, and the Board successfully petitioned
for enforcement in the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed,
accepting the dual status theory, reasoning that the Board had correctly
held that the plain language of § 2(3) dictated treating foremen as
‘‘employees’’ with respect to their own terms and conditions of employment, with full rights, including organizing and bargaining. In dissent,
Justice Douglas rejected the dual status concept, noting the employer’s
dilemma when ‘‘[a]n act of a foreman, if attributed to the management,
constitutes an unfair labor practice; the same act may be part of the
foreman’s activity as an employee. In that event the employer can only
interfere at his peril.’’ The Wagner Act was intended, he reasoned, to
protect ‘‘the right of free association—the right to bargain collectively—
by the great mass of workers, not by those who were in authority over
them and enforcing oppressive industrial policies.’’13 Contemporaneously
with Packard, the Board and the Court had broadly defined ‘‘employee’’
in two other, related contexts: plant guards and independent contractors.14 All three issues—treatment of foremen, contractors, and plant
security staff—were regarded by corporations as unduly expanding their
11

Soss Mfg. Co., 56 NLRB 348 (1944).

12

Packard Motor Car Co., 61 NLRB 4 (1945) (separate unit represented by independent union). See also Packard Motor Car Co., 64 NLRB 1212 (1945) (rejecting employer’s
challenge to certification on ground of union affiliation with rank and file union); L.A.
Young Spring & Wire Corp., 65 NLRB 298 (1946) (unit of higher levels of supervisors);
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 NLRB 386 (1946) (one union representing two separate
units).
13 Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 489–92 (1947); id. at 497, 499
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
14 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947) (plant guards); NLRB v.
E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947) (plant guards); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944) (independent contractors).
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duty to bargain collectively and disrupting their ability to operate
efficiently.
How § 2(11) Came To Be: (2) Congress Reacts by Enacting the Taft–
Hartley Amendments
By the end of World War II, the labor relations tide had turned.15
Although wartime efforts to prevent unionization of foremen, including
the Smith bills of 1943, had failed for lack of support, in 1946 the
Republicans took control of Congress and adopted an omnibus overhaul
of the NLRA (known as the Case bill) that excluded most foremen from
organizing rights. The bill passed Congress, but was vetoed by President
Truman; Congress lacked the votes to override.16 The next year, Congress adopted the Taft–Hartley Act. President Truman vetoed this bill as
well, but this time, Congress overrode the veto. The foremen’s union
drives, especially a strike of the Foremen’s Association of America while
congressional debate was in progress, provided pivotal impetus for Congress’ adoption of the overlapping set of provisions on employee and
supervisory status.
The Taft–Hartley Act neither adopted the Smith bill approach of
outright prohibition against foremen organizing, nor the two-tier approach of the Case bill, which would have preserved bargaining rights
only for foremen in industries with a pre-NLRA history of unionized
foremen. Instead, the law eliminated supervisors from all NLRA rights,
by excluding them from the § 2(3) definition of covered ‘‘employee.’’
Employers were free to ‘‘prohibit supervisors from [union] membership
because Congress believed that granting supervisors a protected right to
join a union [would] be ‘inconsistent with the policy of Congress to
assure workers freedom from domination or control by their supervisors’
and ‘inconsistent with our policy to protect the rights of employers.’ ’’17
15 On Taft–Hartley Act history, in addition to historical sources already cited, this
chapter draws upon David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth
Century Struggle (2d ed. 1993); James A. Gross, The Reshaping of the National Labor
Relations Board: National Labor Policy in Transition, 1937–1947 (1981); R. Alton Lee,
Truman and Taft–Hartley: A Question of Mandate (1966); Harry A. Millis & Emily Clark
Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft–Hartley: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor
Relations (1950); and Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations,
Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960 (1985), as well as NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Reprint ed. 1985)
[hereinafter Legis. Hist.].
16 The Smith bills were H.R. 2239, 78th Cong. (1943) and H.R. 1996, 78th Cong.
(1943). The Case bill was H.R. 4908, 79th Cong. (1946). See H.R. Rep. No. 80–245, at 8, 17
(1947), reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist. at 299, 308. President Truman’s veto message is
reprinted at 1946 U.S.Code Cong. Serv. 1686.
17 NLRB v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 593 n.17 (1987)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 80–245, at 14 (1947), reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist. at 305).
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At the same time, a new § 14(a) disclaimed any prohibition against
‘‘voluntary’’ collective bargaining for supervisors. Where employers and
unions with supervisor members found it in their mutual interest, they
could bargain collectively, albeit outside NLRB auspices. This avoided
any contention that the law violated the asserted constitutional rights of
supervisors to organize.18
The Taft–Hartley framers were eager to address the conflicting
obligations Wagner Act dual role case law had imposed upon employers.
In fact, Taft–Hartley solved some of these problems twice over. Besides
excluding supervisors in § 2(3), Congress insulated from union pressure
the employer’s control over those of its supervisors permitted by the
employer pursuant to § 14(a) to have union representation. In
§ 8(b)(1)(B), Congress limited union disciplinary pressures upon unionized supervisors aimed at influencing the supervisors’ representation of
management’s position in responding to employee grievances, and restricted union pressures aimed at management’s selection of supervisors
to handle grievances or perform collective bargaining-related functions.
Congress narrowed § 2(2) to cut back the range of workers whose acts
could be imputed to the employer as to alleged ULPs. The definition of
employer was changed from ‘‘any person acting in the interest of an
employer’’ to ‘‘any person acting as an agent of an employer.’’
At the heart of Taft–Hartley was its response to business outrage at
the expansive construction of the term ‘‘employee.’’ Congress amended
the § 2(3) definition to exclude both ‘‘supervisors’’ and ‘‘independent
contractors.’’ New, cross-referenced definitions were inserted in § 2,
legislatively overruling the Supreme Court. At the same time, Congress
rejected employer efforts to exclude professional employees and plant
security staff, two groups employers had analogized to supervisors, based
on management’s need for their undivided loyalty as well as their
different class allegiance and higher status compared to laborers. Congress did not adopt the Smith bill formulation for supervisory exclusion,
which would have barred from unionizing ‘‘any individual employed in a
bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or supervisory capacity.’’19 Instead, Congress inserted a definition of ‘‘professional’’ in § 2(12)
and amended the representation provisions of § 9 to provide that professional and non-professional employees could not be combined in a single
bargaining unit unless a majority of the professionals voted in favor of
inclusion. After Taft–Hartley, outside of fields with a pre-NLRA tradi18 Comment, Rights of Supervisory Employees to Collective Bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act, 55 Yale L.J. 754, 766 (1946) (relying upon Tex. & New
Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) and Gompers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911)).
19

H.R. 1996, 78th Cong. (1943). See also H.R. 2239, 78th Cong., § 4 (1943).
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tion of union representation of foremen, few businesses ‘‘voluntarily’’
allowed their foremen to join rank and file bargaining units or to
organize separately. Rather, they addressed the sources of foremen’s
discontent by upgrading front-line supervisors and making them feel
more a part of management. The Foremen’s Association of America
rapidly withered away.
The statutory exclusion of supervisors has provided a whole new
arena for litigation-related delays. The amendment presumed that a
bright line could be drawn between supervisory and non-supervisory
staff. It also presupposed that the organization of jobs and allocation of
supervisory functions would not be altered by management with an eye
to labor law consequences. These assumptions, however, had been debunked by commentators well before enactment of Taft–Hartley.20 The
1947 redefinition of ‘‘employee’’ encouraged employers to label even lowlevel workers as supervisors and to reorganize job responsibilities for
reasons unrelated to economic performance simply to maximize statutory exclusions. More recently, that definition has rewarded litigation
seeking to broaden the definition of supervisor within newer forms of
work organization, excluding expanding categories of workers. These
developments have been especially evident among professionals in the
health care industry. Before considering precisely who is a ‘‘supervisor’’
in light of Taft–Hartley, however, we first review NLRA coverage and
exclusion of health care, which has strongly influenced interpretation of
§ 2(11).
BELATED NLRA COVERAGE OF HEALTH CARE AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR ORGANIZING
Exclusion, and Re–Inclusion of Health Care Institutions Under the
NLRA
Eliminating supervisors and independent contractors was not the
only way Congress changed NLRA coverage in Taft–Hartley. The original Wagner Act covered health care employers, but the 1947 legislation
excluded most of the industry. It amended the § 2(2) definition of
‘‘employer’’ to exempt non-profit hospitals.21 It was not until the Health
Care Amendments Act of 197422 that coverage was restored for all
private sector health care employers. Section 2(14) was added, defining
‘‘health care institution.’’ Special restrictions on strikes against health
20 For example, Comment, Rights of Supervisory Employees to Collective Bargaining
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 55 Yale L.J. 754, 770–71 (1946).
21 Section 2(2) excluded ‘‘any corporation or association operating a hospital if no part
of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.’’ Pub. L.
No. 80–101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
22

Pub. L. No. 93–360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
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care employers were imposed. Congress recognized that ‘‘the needs of
patients in health care institutions required special consideration’’—
essentially, greater protection against disruption of patient care in the
course of labor disputes.23 Subsequent cases regarding solicitation and
distribution of union literature likewise have recognized this priority.24
Strikes interrupting the delivery of health care were a major impetus
behind restoration of NLRA coverage. Congressional testimony indicated
that ninety-five percent of strikes in non-profit hospitals had been
recognitional. Resuming NLRA coverage was expected to reduce recognitional strikes by providing NLRB machinery for establishing enforceable
union representation rights. The special rules regulating health care
industry work stoppages were intended to encourage peaceful resolution
of disputes over new agreements. Congress also hoped that collective
bargaining would improve wages and benefits in the industry, and lead
to better-qualified workers and higher standards of patient care.25
By the time the health care amendments had been adopted, however, the labor relations climate among employers, legislatures, courts, and
the NLRB was less favorable to collective bargaining, compared to earlier
decades, and more delay was to ensue. Seventeen years of litigation over
appropriate units in health care institutions followed adoption of the
1974 amendments, dampening union organizing, especially among RNs
and other professionals.26 Health care is unusual in having a heavy
composition of diverse state-licensed professionals, each with a scope of
practice and professional responsibility governed by state law, and with
highly distinct professional identities. Many technical occupations are
likewise state-regulated. The patient-care occupations are arranged in a
strict education-based status hierarchy, with doctors on top, registered
nurses, technologists, and other professionals below them, LPNs, technicians, and other technical employees underneath them, and nurses aides
and other service employees at the bottom.27 Eventually, the NLRB held
23

S. Rep. No. 93–766, at 3 (1974). The provisions are NLRA §§ 2(14), 8(d), 8(g); LMRA

§ 213.
24 See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB,
437 U.S. 483 (1978).
25 See H.R. Rep. No. 93–1051, at 4 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93–766, at 3 (1974). See also
Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 497–98 & nn. 14–15 and legislative sources cited therein.
26 The discussion regarding appropriate bargaining units in health care facilities is
based on the the Supreme Court opinion in the rulemaking case, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991), the underlying rulemaking proceedings, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142
(July 2, 1987) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (hereinafter NPR I); 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900
(Sept. 1, 1988) (Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (hereinafter NPR II); 54 Fed. Reg.
16,336 (Apr. 21, 1989) (Final Rule), codified at 29 CFR § 103.30 (2004).
27 See, e.g., David R. Kochery & George Strauss, The Nonprofit Hospital and the Union,
9 Buff. L. Rev. 255, 265 (1960).
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its first-ever formal rulemaking proceeding to regularize appropriate
health care bargaining units. The Board found that ‘‘organizing and
initial bargaining among health care workers has historically been by
occupationally homogeneous units,’’ and adopted a rule for acute care
hospitals that put registered nurses, physicians, technical employees,
skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees,
guards, and all other nonprofessional employees each in separate units.
Nursing homes, rehabilitative hospitals, and psychiatric hospitals, however, were excluded from the rule; bargaining units in these types of
facilities remain subject to determination through adjudication.28 Only
after the 1991 Supreme Court decision upheld the rule did organizing in
the industry, especially among RNs and other professionals, begin to
pick up speed.29 It was thus not until the 1990’s that a large volume of
cases arose regarding the supervisory status of health care professionals.
Who is a Supervisor: The Law Before Health Care & Retirement Corp.
In the interim, some aspects of the interpretation of § 2(11) became
settled. Disputes over supervisory status arise in dozens of cases annually.30 The 1947 amendments altered § 2(3), defining ‘‘employee’’ as excluding ‘‘any individual employed as a supervisor,’’ and inserted a new
§ 2(11), defining a ‘‘supervisor’’ as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.
Section 2(11) has been parsed into a three-part test. To be a
supervisor: (1) a worker must possess one or more of the twelve types of
personnel authority listed in § 2(11); (2) the worker must exercise that
authority ‘‘in the interest of the employer,’’ rather than anyone else; and
(3) the worker’s exercise of that authority must ‘‘require the use of
independent judgment’’ rather than be of ‘‘a merely routine or clerical
nature.’’ Because the § 2(11) list is written in the disjunctive, possession
of even one type of authority will render the worker a statutory supervisor. The legislative history indicates that Congress was aiming squarely
28 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a),(f),(2),(g); NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,910; Final Rule, 54 Fed.
Reg. at 16,346, 16,347–48.
29
30

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991).

For numbers in the 1970’s, see Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An
Explanation of Inconsistent Results, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1713, 1713 (1981). The numbers
today are, if anything, greater.
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at excluding foremen in drawing the § 2(11) line between employees and
supervisors. Congress sought to differentiate between ‘‘straw bosses,
leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one
hand, and the supervisor vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such action.’’31 Drawing this line has proven
easier said than done, even in the industrial workplace with its conventional, hierarchical chain of command. In settings deviating from that
model, the task has been vexing indeed.
Forms of authority to make tangible personnel changes are most
readily adjudicable. If the putative supervisor has a record of hiring,
suspending, laying off, recalling, promoting, discharging, conferring pay
increases or other rewards, or disciplining employees, the individual will
be held to be a supervisor. However, neither a job title, such as
‘‘foreman’’ or ‘‘supervisor,’’ nor a paper job description establishes
supervisory status. Some evidence that the individual actually possesses
the authority is necessary. If a worker has held a position for several
years without exercising supervisory authority, the credibility of a job
description purporting to confer it is undermined. If the worker attempts
to exercise the authority but is rebuffed by higher management, the
claim of supervisory status is negated. ‘‘Effectively recommend’’ is
interpreted to mean the marginal supervisor’s recommendations are
usually followed without independent investigation. The Board rejects as
lacking probative value conclusory testimony about authority nominally
conferred upon workers holding a particular job title without specifics
establishing its actuality. Some courts of appeals, however, more readily
accept such general statements as probative.
The Board does not deem supervisory authority to include intermediate personnel functions such as investigation and reporting of incidents, or evaluation of coworkers’ job performance without recommendations regarding discipline, promotion, or pay increase, and without
reward or punishment as a direct consequence. Even oral disciplinary
warnings are held by the Board to be too weak to constitute § 2(11)
disciplinary authority, unless they may lead to tangible personnel consequences. Neither ‘‘evaluate,’’ ‘‘investigate,’’ nor ‘‘report’’ appears on the
§ 2(11) list. On the contrary, the Taft–Hartley conference committee
compromise embraced the Senate language for supervisory status and
rejected the House version, which would have deemed supervisory those
job classifications involving investigative or evaluative functions such as
claims investigators.32 Although some circuits have deferred to the
Board’s interpretation, others have rejected it, holding marginal or
31

S. Rep. No. 80–105, 4, (1947) reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist. at 167–68.
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H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., § 2(12), (1947), reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist. at 167–68.
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intermediate forms of personnel authority sufficient to render a worker a
statutory supervisor. The courts often disagree with the Board’s crediting of facts or drawing of inferences in this area, sometimes making it
difficult to discern whether the circuit court has applied a different
standard for § 2(11) status, or merely decided that the Board’s factfinding was unsupported by substantial evidence, the standard for appellate
review.
Directing work and assigning tasks, divorced from other forms of
§ 2(11) authority, have posed the greatest problem. The Board has never
fully resolved whether ‘‘assignment’’ is limited to assigning individual
workers to shifts, departments, and job classifications, or whether it also
reaches assigning individual tasks to a worker. The syntax and context
of § 2(11) suggests the former, leaving task assignment to be addressed
under the ‘‘responsibly direct’’ rubric. Board treatment of responsible
direction is even murkier. Many years ago, the Board adopted a narrow
construction of ‘‘responsibly to direct’’ based on its understanding of
general legislative intent in 1947. This analysis was promptly rejected by
the Sixth Circuit in favor of a broad, dictionary definition, later accepted
in several other circuits: ‘‘To be responsible is to be answerable for the
discharge of a duty or obligation.’’33 The NLRB has avoided rather than
resolved the issue, determining supervisory status, insofar as possible,
without relying on ‘‘responsible direction.’’ Failing that, it has interpreted ‘‘responsible direction’’ only as modified by ‘‘independent judgment,’’
in a single package, leaning heavily on the ‘‘independent judgment’’
element to avoid interpreting ‘‘responsible.’’ ‘‘Responsible direction’’ has
been problematic in industrial cases, and even more so in professional
employment.
Rather than excluding professionals, the Taft–Hartley Act in
§ 9(b)(1) treated them specially as to bargaining unit placement. It also
added § 2(12), defining ‘‘professional employee’’ as an employee engaged
in ‘‘predominantly intellectual and varied’’ work ‘‘involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment’’ and ‘‘requiring knowledge of
an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an
institution of higher learning or a hospital.’’ The task in cases alleging a
professional to be a statutory supervisor is thus to differentiate between
the exercise of ‘‘independent judgment’’ in the performance of personnel
functions listed in § 2(11) as supervisory attributes, on the one hand,
and the exercise of professional ‘‘discretion and judgment’’ in the performance of professional work described in § 2(12)(a)(ii), on the other. In
addition, that § 2(12) also defines a professional to include new profes33 Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387, (1949) denying enforcement of 80 NLRB
1334 (1948).
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sional school graduates who are completing their qualification for professional credentials by ‘‘working under the supervision of a professional
person,’’ seems to contemplate professional employees overseeing the
work performance of trainees. This is in tension with the inclusion of
‘‘responsibly to direct’’ in the list of § 2(11) forms of authority which
render a worker a supervisor. Placing emphasis on ‘‘responsibly,’’ and
requiring that the supervisor be above the supposed subordinate in a
reporting hierarchy could reconcile the two provisions, and would fit well
with the 1947 Congress’ central focus on foremen and those above them
in the hierarchy when it enacted § 2(11). It would be at odds, however,
with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of ‘‘responsibly direct,’’ at least
outside the professional employee context.
The great majority of disputed supervisory status cases before the
1980’s involved employees in occupations such as shop foreman, plant
superintendent, and store manager, which are subject to unregulated
employer discretion as to job title and content. The factual inquiry as to
whether at a particular facility, a person holding the title ‘‘foreman’’
actually possesses the requisite authority under § 2(11) has always had
to be conducted separately in every case. As a general rule, the NLRB
leaned in favor of a narrow construction of each aspect of supervisory
authority. A broad interpretation of § 2(11) might advantage an employer seeking to exclude a borderline supervisor from collective bargaining,
or to avoid a ULP charge for discriminating because of the putative
supervisor’s union sympathies. However, it might advantage a union
seeking to exclude the anti-union, borderline supervisor’s vote in a
representation election, or in imputing the marginal supervisor’s antiunion interference to the employer in a different ULP case.
It was not until professionals began organizing on a larger scale that
construction of § 2(11) became tied consistently to NLRA treatment of
particular categories of workers. Educational, licensure, and regulatory
requirements, especially in the health care industry, have standardized
elements of many professional and technical job descriptions. In these
occupations, although union and employer interests remain subject to ad
hoc considerations favoring labeling a particular worker an ‘‘employee’’
or a ‘‘supervisor,’’ the two sides also take into account systemic considerations, with unions favoring the employee label, and employers favoring
the supervisor label for many professionals. It is no coincidence that the
two Supreme Court cases construing the elements of § 2(11) arise in the
context of professional health care employees.
HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT CORPORATION: DRY RUN FOR KENTUCKY RIVER
Starting in the mid–1970’s, the Supreme Court decided three cases,
each by a 5–4 vote, involving NLRB categorical exclusions from the
definition of employee in which the Court emphasized that the ‘‘employ-
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er is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives.’’34 In each,
the Court construed aspects of § 2(11) or § 2(12), or both, in order to
decide these other issues. First, in 1974, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Company,35 the Court created an implied exclusion from § 2(3) employee
status for all managerial employees, rejecting the NLRB’s narrower
exclusion of only those managers involved in labor relations decisionmaking. The Court concluded that despite its silence in Taft–Hartley,
and its narrow, express exclusion of supervisors in § 2(11), ‘‘Congress
intended to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees
properly classified as ‘managerial.’ ’’ The Court endorsed older NLRB
case law excluding on that basis ‘‘ ‘executives who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative decisions of
their employer.’ ’’36 Second, the Court in 1980 in NLRB v. Yeshiva
University applied the managerial exclusion to the collegial, collective
decisionmaking powers of a university faculty over curriculum, grading
policies, teaching methods, and matriculation standards. The Court
reasoned, ‘‘the faculty determines TTT the product to be produced, the
terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be
served,’’ concluding that ‘‘it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these.’’37 However, the next year, the Court backed away
from its trend toward broad, implied exclusions from coverage. In NLRB
v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.,38 the Court upheld the NLRB’s longstanding exclusion from bargaining units of those
employees with access to confidential labor relations information, while
not excluding workers whose jobs made them privy to non-labor-relations confidential business information.
All three cases relied on legislative history; the plain language of
§ 2(3) entitles any employee not specifically excluded to the protections
of the statute. In each of the three, the § 2(12) treatment of professionals played a role in the analysis. In both Bell Aerospace and Yeshiva, the
Court went to great pains to make clear that it did not intend the
judicially-implied managerial exclusion to eviscerate Congress’ express
inclusion of professionals. The Yeshiva Court cited approvingly NLRB
decisions in which professionals working as project captains of teams of
professionals were ‘‘deemed employees despite substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team members,’’ including one case involving nurses. Yeshiva also pointed for support to the
34

NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980).

35

416 U.S. 267 (1974).

36 Id. at 275, 286 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 NLRB 320, 323 n.4
(1947)).
37

444 U.S. at 686.

38

454 U.S. 170 (1981).
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fact that ‘‘[i]n the health care context, the Board asks in each case
whether the decisions alleged to be managerial or supervisory are
‘incidental to’ or ‘in addition to’ the treatment of patients, a test
Congress expressly approved in 1974’’ in adopting the health care
amendments to the NLRA.39
In Hendricks County, to support limitation of the implied confidential employee exclusion to workers with direct access to secret laborrelations related materials, the Court relied on the Taft–Hartley conference committee’s rejection of the House bill’s broad definition of ‘‘supervisor,’’ which would have encompassed a wide range of confidential
employees as well as professionals. The conference committee adopted
instead the Senate version, which ‘‘confined the definition of supervisor
to individuals generally regarded as foremen and employees of like or
higher rank.’’ The Court also pointed to § 2(12), covering such professionals as ‘‘ ‘legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel together
with their junior professional assistants,’ TTT almost all [of whom] would
likely be privy to confidential business informationTTTT It would TTT be
extraordinary to read an implied exclusion for confidential employees
into the statute that would swallow up TTT the professional-employee
inclusion.’’40
Commentators after Bell Aerospace and Yeshiva were apprehensive
that doctrinal developments were creating a slippery slope which might
eviscerate statutory coverage of professionals.41 The Board, however,
perhaps lulled into complacency by the Court’s reasoning supporting
preservation of professional employee coverage, continued to follow its
line of health care cases, finding supervisory status when the health care
professional’s exercise of authority over a less highly educated coworker
was ‘‘in addition to’’ as opposed to ‘‘incidental to’’ patient care. The
Sixth Circuit was particularly vehement in rejecting the Board’s interpretation in nursing cases. The NLRB successfully petitioned for certiorari in one, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
(HCR).42
39

444 U.S. at 690 & n.30.

40

Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 184 n.15, 184–85 (quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 6442 (1947)
(remarks of Senator Taft) and quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 80–510, at 36 (1947)).
41 See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, The Supervisory Status of Professional Employees, 45
Fordham L. Rev. 805 (1977); Marina Angel, Professionals and Unionization, 66 Minn. L.
Rev. 383 (1982); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered
Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1775 (1989); Marion Crain, Building
Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment,
74 Minn. L. Rev. 953, 972–73 (1990).
42 511 U.S. 571 (1994). Facts of the case which go beyond those reported in the
Supreme Court opinion are taken from the decision of the NLRB Administrative Law
Judge, 306 NLRB 63, 68 (1992).
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Health Care & Retirement Corporation had been charged with
disciplining four LPNs in retaliation for their concerted activities. If they
were supervisors, the discipline could not have violated the Act. The
nursing home’s nursing department was headed by a director and
assistant director, two § 2(11) supervisors. Reporting to them were
about ten nurses, some of whom were RNs and others LPNs, plus about
fifty nurses aides. Both types of nurses were assigned the same duties,
an approach common in nursing homes. The Court therefore examined
the case as though the LPNs were professional rather than technical
employees.
The Board had defended the case before the Supreme Court on the
basis of the agency’s rule that when ‘‘the nurses’ direction of other
employees is carried out in the exercise of professional judgment and is
incidental to the treatment of patients,’’ it is not ‘‘in the interest of the
employer,’’ and hence does not constitute § 2(11) authority. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the 5–4 majority of the Court rejected the NLRB’s
use of the third § 2(11) prong, ‘‘in the interest of the employer,’’ to
differentiate between professional task delegation to and oversight of
less skilled workers, on the one hand, and general responsible direction
of subordinates by a superior, on the other. The HCR Court rejected the
Board’s ‘‘incidental to patient care’’ gloss on ‘‘in the interest of the
employer’’ not only as being contrary to the plain meaning of the phrase,
which the Court emphatically claimed was unambiguous, but also as
contravening the broad interpretation the 1947 Packard Court placed on
the phrase as it appeared in the Wagner Act § 2(2) definition of
employer. The Court also criticized the Board’s interpretation of ‘‘in the
interest of the employer’’ as, in effect, reading ‘‘responsibly to direct’’
out of the Act as to nurses, and castigated the Board for creating an
interpretation of ‘‘in the interest of the employer’’ unique for a profession or industry.
Whatever the weaknesses of the Court’s analysis in terms of syntax
and history, the Board’s distinction between discretionary actions based
on professional norms and those based on personnel authority delegated
by the employer was too heavy a load to place on the phrase ‘‘in the
interest of the employer’’ standing alone. The NLRB’s point would have
been stronger had it been based on the legislative policies and compromises embodied in the Taft–Hartley Act as a whole, and the entirety of
§ 2(11) in particular. Before the Supreme Court, however, the Board had
boxed itself in, formally limiting itself to interpretation of ‘‘in the
interest of the employer,’’ rather than arguing on all three bases—in the
interest, independent judgment, and responsible direction—alternatively,
or construed together.
For the NLRB, the HCR opinion provided contradictory messages.
The Court emphasized that its opinion addressed only the ‘‘in the
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interest of the employer’’ phrase, and no other portion of § 2(11).
Because the Court distinguished similar reasoning in other professional
employee cases as relying on the ‘‘independent judgment’’ phrase rather
than the ‘‘in the interest’’ phrase of § 2(11), it was easy for the Board to
read HCR as leaving open the interpretation of ‘‘independent judgment’’
and of each of the twelve listed forms of supervisory authority, including
‘‘responsibly to direct.’’ Moreover, although the Court claimed that ‘‘in
the interest of the employer’’ is clear and unambiguous, it conceded that
‘‘independent judgment’’ and ‘‘responsibly to direct’’ are ambiguous,
entailing judicial deference to the NLRB’s reasonable construction of
these terms.
Despite these assurances, however, HCR also contained many warning flags for the Board. Portions of the opinion assume an expansive
meaning for ‘‘independent judgment,’’ ‘‘assign,’’ and ‘‘responsibly to
direct.’’ In characterizing the facts regarding the nurses’ job, the Court’s
conclusory description more closely resembles the employer’s and the
Sixth Circuit’s version than it does the NLRB’s carefully detailed rendition, despite the statutory requirement that the Board’s findings of fact
be conclusive on the courts so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.
Soon after HCR was decided, the NLRB General Counsel advocated
taking the Court at its word on limiting the holding to interpretation of
‘‘in the interest of the employer.’’ His approach was a two-legged one,
depending simultaneously on construction of ‘‘independent judgment,’’
the other phrase of limitation in § 2(11), and on construction, rather
than fact-specific application, of the ambiguous terms among the list of
twelve forms of supervisory authority, particularly ‘‘assign,’’ and ‘‘responsibly to direct.’’43 The NLRB then decided a hospital case, Providence
Hospital and a nursing home case, Ten Broeck Commons,44 which only
partially followed the course urged by the General Counsel. The Board
took at face value the Court’s pronouncements limiting the HCR holding
to ‘‘in the interest of the employer.’’ However, the Board rejected the
General Counsel’s two-legged approach, also strenuously urged upon it
by the AFL–CIO, and chose instead to stand only on one leg, construction of ‘‘independent judgment.’’ The Board held that nurses’ direction
and assignment of tasks to less-educated and less-trained nurses, nursing assistants and aides is ‘‘merely routine,’’ and does not reflect § 2(11)
‘‘independent judgment,’’ so long as the decisionmaking is sufficiently
43 See, e.g., Cascade Care Ctr., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 90 (Nov. 7, 1995); Wesley
Willows, 1994 NLRB GCM LEXIS 83 (Nov. 17, 1994); Villa Elizabeth, Inc., 1995 NLRB
GCM LEXIS 95 (Mar. 10, 1995); North Oakland Med. Ctrs., 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS 96
(Mar. 8, 1995).
44 Providence Hosp., 320 NLRB 717 (1996); Nymed, Inc., d/b/a/ Ten Broeck Commons,
320 NLRB 806 (1996).
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cabined by directives from the employer or by professional norms. The
Board said it was applying its ‘‘traditional analysis for determining the
supervisory status of employees in other occupations,’’ in an effort to
comply with the HCR Court’s holding that the Act does not distinguish
professional employees from others in the § 2(11) definition of supervisor.
The Board Members, General Counsel and staff were keenly aware
that § 2(11) was headed back to the Supreme Court. Guidelines were
issued instructing the regions to follow the Providence Hospital and Ten
Broeck Commons ‘‘independent judgment’’ rubric in all cases.45 The
circuits fragmented, some deferring to the NLRB’s statutory interpretation and factfinding, others skeptical but moderate in tone, and the
Fourth and Sixth extremely hostile.46 The Sixth Circuit declared the
Board’s new analysis ‘‘disingenuous,’’ a manipulative shell game to
support the Board’s continuing to treat cases exactly as it had previously. What the Board regarded as an invitation from the Supreme Court to
devise a new rubric to support similar results, some of the circuit courts,
especially the Sixth, saw as the Court’s warning shot across the agency’s
bow. The NLRB staff did not want legal developments to turn on the
chance decision of an employer to seek certiorari, or on the calculated
decision of an employer group to target a case for Supreme Court review.
They scrutinized circuit court rulings, looking for a clean case with an
adverse appellate decision based on minimal indicia of supervisory status. Such a case would afford an appealing vehicle for the agency to
return to the Court with the Board’s new § 2(11) analysis. In Kentucky
River, the NLRB believed that it had found one.47
Factual Background
The organizing drive in Kentucky River had some distinctive aspects,
but none which would have led the participants to anticipate their case
going to the Supreme Court.48 In the fall of 1996, Glenn Moore ap45 Telephone Interview with NLRB Associate General Counsel John H. Ferguson,
December 17, 2004.
46 See, e.g., NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (deferential); Passavant Ret. & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 1998) (intermediate);
Beverly Enters., Va., Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (hostile);
Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
47 Telephone Interview with former Member Fox, December 17, 2004; Telephone
Interview with NLRB Associate General Counsel Ferguson, December 17, 2004; Telephone
Interview with former NLRB General Counsel Feinstein, December 16, 2004.
48 The factual background is derived from telephone interviews with Schulz and Miller,
October 1, 2004 and December 17, 2004, and from the NLRB Region Nine file in Kentucky
River Community Care, Inc., NLRB Case No. 9–RC–16837, and the Region Nine file in
Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., NLRB Case No. 9–CA–34926. Excluding portions as
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proached the Kentucky State District Council of Carpenters about organizing the employees at KRCC’s Caney Creek psychiatric rehabilitation
and long-term care facility. The union’s director of organizing, Lawrence
Hujo, tried to talk Moore into approaching some other union. The
Carpenters Union primarily represents skilled trades workers at construction sites, not professional and technical employees at health care
facilities. Moore, however, had decided that he and his fellow employees
really needed a union. He had asked around among his political and
union contacts, seeking the best union in the area, and was repeatedly
told that the Carpenters Union ‘‘would treat you right.’’ Moore continued to press the Carpenters to organize at Caney Creek.
Because of Moore’s persistence and enthusiasm, the Carpenters
Union reconsidered. His web of connections and support at Caney Creek
had already halfway organized the workforce. Once the Carpenters
Union undertook the campaign, it put its full effort into it. The campaign rapidly moved from initial organizing to amassing enough support
to demand employer recognition and file the election petition with the
NLRB. Major issues in the campaign included the difficult job conditions,
low pay, and control over scheduling and staffing. Arbitrary exercise of
management discretion over pay increases was a particularly festering
irritation for those workers who were not in their supervisors’ social
clique since the unit coordinators and nursing coordinator had almost
unfettered discretion in performance evaluations that determined pay
increases. After organizing for a little over a month, on January 22,
1997, union organizer Hujo wrote to KRCC demanding recognition.
When the employer refused, on January 27, Hujo filed the union’s
petition with the NLRB Region Nine office in Cincinnati, Ohio. The
estimated eighty-six employee unit included the six RNs, the twenty
rehabilitation counselors, as well as the single licensed practical nurse
then on the payroll, the forty rehabilitation assistants, a few recreation
assistants, and some kitchen, service and maintenance workers. The
union submitted as its showing of interest union authorization cards
signed by about eighty percent of the proposed bargaining unit.
Because Moore was the key in-facility organizer, the rehabilitation
counselors were the heart of the union’s support and the crucial strategic factor shaping the bargaining unit requested in the petition. There
was no question of the union seeking to represent the rehabilitation
to which privilege was asserted, the files were provided to the author by the NLRB
pursuant to a series of requests submitted under the Freedom of Information Act. Some
documents are reprinted in the appendix section of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., available at ¢http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme court/docket/2000/febdocket.html$ [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari]
and excerpts from the transcript and exhibits in the representation proceeding are
reprinted in the Joint Appendix (J.A.), available on microfiche.
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assistants, recreation assistants, and LPNs alone, in a technical employee unit. The union was unsure whether the rehabilitation counselors
would properly be characterized as professionals in any event. As union
in-house counsel Tom Schulz put it, the union ‘‘bluffed’’ the issue,
simply asking for a single, all non-supervisory, non-guard bargaining
unit. KRCC counsel did not focus on it. The RNs, unlike the rehabilitation counselors, were not essential to the union, even though some were
among the union’s strongest supporters. Being in the Sixth Circuit,
where HCR had been decided before it went to the Supreme Court,
union counsel was aware that the RNs were likely to be challenged as
supervisory. They were included in the unit, not only because they were
union supporters, but also as a ‘‘diversionary tactic, if need be, to tradeoff and get the rest’’ of the workers, said Schulz.
The union’s petition blindsided management, which had had little
awareness of the organizing campaign until it received Hujo’s formal
demand for recognition. Management retained counsel George J. Miller
only at that point. Miller, an experienced labor lawyer, was a partner in
the Lexington, Kentucky office of the 200-attorney, Louisville-based law
firm of Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs. KRCC responded to the petition first,
by claiming to be exempt from the Act; and second, by trying to exclude
as supervisors both the RNs and the rehabilitation counselors, in effect
arguing that its entire professional employee complement fell outside the
protections of the NLRA. The first argument contended that KRCC, a
non-profit corporation, was operating in lieu of a state governmentcreated body, with authority contractually delegated to it by the state
and with its discretion in personnel matters so heavily constrained by its
contract with the state that it should be deemed a governmental unit.
Miller later explained, ‘‘If we won on the first issue, the case was over. If
we won on the second issue, we would have carved those people out of
the unit and made them available to use in campaigning against the
union.’’ Employers commonly resort to a third, fallback strategy if preelection legal strategies fail: trying to defeat the union in the election,
through legal means such as captive audience speeches and campaign
literature, or through tactics of dubious legality, such as promises of
benefits if employees vote against the union, ‘‘predictions’’ that job loss
will ensue if the union wins, or firing of leading union supporters
ostensibly for disciplinary reasons. KRCC’s election campaign efforts fit
this pattern, but they were insufficient to derail the pro-union majority.
Prior Proceedings
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NLRB: THE REPRESENTATION PROCEEDING
The representation case was assigned to Natalie Morton of the
NLRB Region Nine office. She verified the union’s ‘‘showing of interest,’’
and in a pre-hearing conference call, unsuccessfully tried to persuade the

374

KENTUCKY RIVER

parties to consent to an election in an agreed-upon bargaining unit. In
February 1997, Morton presided over a pre-election hearing in the Perry
County Courthouse in Hazard, Kentucky, which lasted a total of about
nine hours. Although regional staff members preside over representation
case hearings, the regional directors issue quasi-adjudicatory decisions
resolving disputed matters on the basis of the record created in the
hearing. On February 21, 1997, Region Nine Regional Director Richard
L. Ahearn issued his Decision and Direction of Election, finding KRCC to
be covered by the Act, and finding both the registered nurses and the
rehabilitation counselors to be ‘‘professional employees’’ and not ‘‘supervisors’’ under the Act.
The Caney Creek complex was headed by administrator Leonard
Echols, who reported directly to KRCC CEO Louise Howell. Reporting to
Echols were the assistant administrator, the nursing coordinator, and
unit coordinator Mark Stone, as well as a second unit coordinator whose
position was then vacant, with Echols himself filling in in the interim.
These positions were stipulated to be § 2(11) supervisors. The facility is
divided into four identical twenty-bed units, each staffed by five rehabilitation coordinators and ten rehabilitation assistants. Each of the two
unit coordinators was in charge of two of the four units. Each unit
coordinator thus had thirty subordinates: ten rehabilitation coordinators
and twenty rehabilitation assistants. In each unit, four of the five
rehabilitation coordinators worked the day shift, while one worked a
swing shift, covering the afternoon half of the day shift, and early
evening portion of the evening shift. The ten rehabilitation assistants
per unit were divided up among all three shifts, although more assistants
worked the day shift to handle many of the activities and training
programs for residents.
The employer contended that the rehabilitation counselors directed
the work of the rehabilitation assistants with sufficient independent
judgment and discretion to be § 2(11) supervisors. The Regional Director
found, however, that the rehabilitation counselors ‘‘do not have the
authority to hire, fire, discipline, promote, or evaluate employees and
any assignment or direction which they may give other employees is
routine.’’49 The Regional Director followed Providence Hospital and Ten
Broeck Commons in determining that mere authority to coordinate the
work of others is not sufficient independent judgment to satisfy § 2(11),
and that mere formulation of treatment plans fulfilled by other employees is not a form of § 2(11) authority at all. He distinguished HCR as
limited to the ‘‘in the interest of the employer’’ analysis. He bolstered
his conclusion by noting that under KRCC’s analysis, there would be an
49 Decision and Direction of Election at 7, reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
35a, 49a.
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unrealistic 1:2 ratio of supervisor rehabilitation counselors to subordinate rehabilitation assistants.
The employer’s claim of supervisory status for RNs was artfully
bolstered by conflation of two separate bases for arguing about their
supervisory status: their regular role as nurses and their role as building
supervisors when management was away from the premises. Nursing
coordinator Alicia Cook had authority over all nurses. Fully staffed, the
facility employed six RNs and three LPNs, but as of the hearing only one
LPN was on the payroll. The nurses were the only trained medical
personnel in the facility at most times; the doctor and psychiatrist were
independent contractors on the premises a few hours per week. The six
RNs were assigned two to a shift, rotating across all seven days per
week, to ensure 24/7 coverage. Each RN worked about four weekend
shifts per month. The primary role of the RN was to provide direct
medical services to the residents, and to document medical treatment
and changes in medical condition of residents, acting under the instructions of the resident’s physician or psychiatrist. She either herself
administered all doctor-ordered medication or was responsible for documenting its administration by an LPN. She also cooperated with the
rehabilitation counselor in development and revision of individual resident treatment plans, with regard to the medical aspects of those plans.
She was not in the line of supervision or regular direction of either
rehabilitation counselors or rehabilitation assistants. The employer’s
own treatment in its formal job descriptions of supervisor-subordinate
reporting relationships, its employment handbook references to supervisors’ role in performance evaluation, pay increases, and grievance procedures, as well as the verbal usage throughout the testimony of KRCC’s
management witnesses, consistently labeled only the unit coordinators
and nursing coordinator as supervisors. Both the rehabilitation assistant
job description and the rehabilitation counselor job description showed
these workers as reporting to the unit coordinator as their supervisor,
not to the RN, or for that matter, the rehabilitation counselor. The
employer did not offer into evidence the job description of either the RN
or the LPN position.
The employer’s argument rested on two very thin bases to claim the
RNs responsibly directed other workers, exercising independent judgment, in their regular job duties: they had to ensure proper LPN
administration of medication when an LPN was on duty simultaneously
with the RN, and they occasionally requested help from a rehabilitation
assistant in dealing with an unruly resident. If the RNs were all
supervisors over the single LPN, the supervisor-to-subordinate ratio
would have been a ridiculous 6:1; even with a full three LPN complement, it would still have been 2:1. Moreover, Registered Nurse Alice
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Anderson testified that the RNs and LPNs had a relationship of equality
at the facility.
The stronger aspect of KRCC’s contention that the RNs were
supervisors rested on their role as ‘‘building supervisor’’ when none of
the stipulated § 2(11) supervisors were on the premises at night and on
weekends. The details of this role, however, were hotly contested. The
union offered what it contended was the only officially disseminated
description of the special duties added to the RN position when the RN
served as building supervisor. The memorandum indicated that the main
role of the building supervisor was to buffer the off-duty, on-call manager from unnecessary telephone calls, and also to make sure minimum
staffing requirements were met on each unit. If unexpected absences or
weather emergencies reduced the ratio of staff to residents below unit
minimums pre-set by management, the building supervisor was to obtain
additional staff to restore the minimum ratio. Solving the staff ratio
problem could be done by moving a rehabilitation assistant from a unit
with excess staff to the short-staffed unit for the duration of the shift; or,
absent extra staff, the building supervisor could ask someone to stay
over from the departing shift; failing that, she could call someone in to
work who would otherwise be off duty.
The employer offered two additional memos documenting beefed-up
authority for the building supervisor, but testimony failed clearly to
establish whether the memos were ever distributed to employees. These
memos increased the authority and responsibility of the building supervisor by placing her in charge of the entire facility and giving her the
duty to check staffing levels every day when she came on duty, authorizing her to require, rather than merely request, the affected staff member
to switch units, work overtime, or report to work, and instructing her to
‘‘write up’’ anyone who refused her instruction. One manager testified
that the building supervisor not only could require staff to work longer
or come in from home to meet minimum ratio requirements, but that
she also had the discretion to increase the staffing level above the pre-set
minimum if problems arose with residents on a unit during a particular
shift. This witness also testified that the building supervisor had authority to send home from work a worker who was intoxicated or otherwise
misbehaving, and only thereafter contact the employee’s regular supervisor, although she conceded that this had never occurred. This evidence
conflicted with Nurse Anderson’s testimony that such actions would
have exceeded the scope of her authority, and that she would first have
contacted the on-call administrator for instructions prior to taking any
action. The only time Anderson had failed to get advance approval from
the on-call supervisor before asking an employee to stay over to meet
pre-set ratios, she had been reprimanded by unit coordinator Mark
Stone, the on-call manager, and the other employee was sent home early
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so that KRCC would not have to pay overtime. The employer’s own
witness, Caney Creek’s top manager, Echols, corroborated Anderson’s
testimony that as building supervisor, the RN could only request, and
not require other workers to stay over or come in to work on a day off,
and that in calling in employees during inclement weather, they simply
resorted to the list of local employees provided by management. Testimony that there was no formal handover of authority when the last
administrator left the building for the day, and that when two RNs were
on duty at once, they decided among themselves which one should fill
the role, further bolstered the union’s depiction of the modest, informal
nature of the building supervisor role.
The Regional Director, after noting that the employer had the
burden of proof on § 2(11) status, concluded that even when serving as
building supervisors the RNs were not statutory supervisors. At most, he
found, they could request coworkers, such as LPNs and rehabilitation
assistants, to perform tasks routinely part of the coworkers’ job description, and, as building supervisors, in accordance with pre-set policies
about staffing ratios, could ask workers to remain on the job after the
end of their shift or could call in volunteers. He specifically found the
building supervisor RNs ‘‘do not have any authority TTT to compel an
employee to stay over or come in to fill a vacancy under threat of
discipline.’’50 The functions, he held, are too routine to qualify as
independent judgment for purposes of § 2(11). The Regional Director
ordered that the election be held in two separate voting groups, one
composed of the non-professionals, and the other composed of the
professional employees, i.e., the RNs and the rehabilitation counselors.
He further held each of these two separate bargaining units, as well as
the combined unit, appropriate. The votes of the professional group were
to be counted at the outset. If a majority voted for inclusion in the
overall unit, then its votes on whether to have the Carpenters as
bargaining representative would be counted together with the votes of
the non-professional employees, and a majority of the total votes cast by
the workforce would be required for the union to prevail; otherwise each
group’s votes for or against unionization would be counted separately.
On March 6, 1997, the employer filed a request for review of the
Regional Director’s decision with the NLRB in Washington. To obtain
this discretionary review, the requester must show ‘‘compelling reasons.’’ On March 21, 1997, a panel composed of NLRB Chairman
William B. Gould, IV, plus Members Sarah M. Fox and John E. Higgins,
Jr. issued a one-sentence order, denying the request ‘‘as it raised no
substantial issues warranting review.’’ The panel viewed both the RN
50 Decision and Direction of Election at 8, reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
at 35a, 51a.
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and rehabilitation counselor issues as routine applications of the NLRB’s
recent decisions in Providence Hospital and Ten Broeck Commons.51
The election campaign took place while the request for review was
pending in March 1997. The union’s campaign at the outset highlighted
the same festering issues that originally had led Glenn Moore to approach the Carpenters Union. On February 26, 1997, however, management suspended Moore, and on March 13, fired him. Several other union
activists also were discharged in the course of the campaign. The union
filed a series of ULP charges, challenging not only the allegedly discriminatory discipline and discharge practices, but also claiming that the
employer had offered a new discounted vacation package to employees,
had discriminated in permitting employee posting of anti- as opposed to
pro-union literature, had threatened the loss of business and jobs if
employees voted for the union, and had threatened that it would refuse
to negotiate anyway if employees voted in the union. The union also
included a request to proceed, so that the charges would not block the
election timetable.52 The discharged workers also filed for unemployment
compensation. When the employer contested their claims, Tom Schulz
represented them for free, and the employees all won their benefits by
establishing that KRCC’s anti-union animus rather than employee misconduct was the reason for their discharge. Anti-union firings sometimes
deflate support for a union seeking to organize a workforce. At Caney
Creek, however, Moore and some of the others became martyrs to the
union cause, solidifying employee support for union representation.
The election was conducted and the ballots were counted. A 15–4
majority of the professional group was tallied as having voted for
inclusion in the combined bargaining unit. The ballots of all employees
were then counted together. Of approximately ninety-six eligible voters,
ninety-one actually had attempted to vote. Fifty-six employees voted for
the union, twenty-nine voted against, with six casting challenged ballots.
Because the number of challenged votes was too small to affect the
outcome of the election, the results were certified without those ballots
being opened.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NLRB: THE TECHNICAL REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
Armed with the certification, on April 24, 1997, the Carpenters
Union wrote to KRCC, requesting that it commence collective bargaining. KRCC counsel Miller replied that the employer ‘‘declines to recognize or bargain with the union, for the purpose of testing the Regional
Director’s certification of the union.’’ On May 20, the union filed an
51

Interview with former Member Sarah M. Fox, Silver Spring, Maryland, August 28,

2004.
52

Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., NLRB Charge No. 9–CA–34653–3.
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unfair labor practice charge, initiating a ‘‘technical refusal to bargain
case,’’ in which the employer’s refusal to bargain with the union provides the procedural vehicle for the employer to obtain federal appellate
court review of the underlying representation proceeding, which is not
otherwise reviewable. The NLRB issued a formal complaint, KRCC filed
an answer, and in rapid order, the General Counsel moved for summary
judgment, the case was transferred to the Board in Washington, and an
opportunity was provided for KRCC to file a response. On July 10, 1997,
the same three-member panel that had previously rejected the employer’s request for review in the representation proceeding issued the
NLRB Decision and Order in the ULP case.53 It granted summary
judgment, holding that the employer’s admitted refusal to recognize and
bargain with the union violated § 8(a)(5) and § 8(a)(1).
PROCEEDINGS

IN THE

COURT

OF

APPEALS

On July 15, 1997 Region Nine Director Ahearn wrote to Miller to
advise that he was recommending commencement of proceedings to
enforce the NLRB’s order. Two days later, Miller filed a petition for
review of the order with the Sixth Circuit.54 A week after that, however,
KRCC changed counsel. Michael W. Hawkins and Cheryl E. Bruner, of
the Cincinnati law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl, took over as counsel for
KRCC. Hawkins, with decades of experience handling NLRA matters,
would represent the employer in both the Sixth Circuit and in the
Supreme Court. The NLRB, in the meantime, had cross-applied for
enforcement and the union had moved to intervene, which the charging
party in a ULP proceeding may do as a matter of right.
Despite the change in counsel, the employer made similar arguments before the circuit court that it had made during the representation proceeding. The lion’s share of KRCC’s briefs was devoted to the
political subdivision argument, with only short sections contending,
alternatively, that RNs and rehabilitation counselors were statutory
supervisors. They relied heavily on the authority conferred in the two
contested building supervisor memos, treating them as undisputed fact
even though the Regional Director had failed to credit them as having
been implemented. Hawkins artfully utilized prior cases in which the
53

323 NLRB No. 209 (1997), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26a.

54 The description of proceedings in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Case No. 97–
5885/97–5983 is taken from telephone interviews with Thomas Schulz, October 1, 2004,
George Miller, December 17, 2004, and Michael Hawkins, January 13, 2005, the court’s
docket sheet in the case, reprinted at J.A. 3–4, as well as the briefs and papers submitted by
the parties, and the judgment of the court. These portions of the appellate court file were
provided by the NLRB pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. The judgment of
the Sixth Circuit and the order denying the employer’s suggestion for rehearing en banc
are reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 61a and 64a.
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Sixth Circuit had found nursing home charge nurses to be supervisors
and reversed NLRB decisions. His brief reiterated the Sixth Circuit’s
own protestation that the Board ‘‘has steadfastly failed to apply’’ Sixth
Circuit precedent in nurse supervisor cases, and characterized the KRCC
case as yet ‘‘another situation where the NLRB has ignored the Sixth
Circuit.’’55 KRCC also briefly discussed another Sixth Circuit precedent,
NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home, noting parenthetically
that that case states that the NLRB ‘‘always has the burden of coming
forward with evidence showing that the employees are not supervisors in
bargaining unit determinations.’’56 The thrust of the KRCC briefs was to
induce the circuit court to analogize the building supervisor RNs, as well
as the rehabilitation counselors, to charge nurses, whom a series of Sixth
Circuit cases had found to be supervisors because they regularly delegate
patient care tasks to nurses aides.
The NLRB brief framed the issue quite differently—whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the rehabilitation
counselors and the registered nurses were not supervisors.57 The brief
documented evidence substantiating the Regional Director’s factfinding
about the RNs’ authority and noted the conflicting evidence about
dissemination of the pivotal building supervisor memoranda. The brief
succumbed to the temptation to rely on NLRB case law holding that RNs
delegating patient care tasks to LPNs and aides constitutes ‘‘routine’’
performance of the RNs’ professional duties, not ‘‘responsible direction’’
of less skilled employees ‘‘in the exercise of independent judgment.’’
Although the brief distinguished adverse Sixth Circuit authority on
nurse supervisors on the grounds that the nurses in those cases had
disciplinary, overtime assignment, and pay-related evaluation responsibilities, the brief also suggested that those cases were inconsistent with
the NLRB’s new approach because they relied on a different phrase in
§ 2(11). This strategy might have prompted the circuit court to bridle at
the agency’s resistance to following circuit court case law. The brief also
implicitly seemed to accept the employer’s overstatement of the degree
to which RNs supervised other employees in administering medication
and delivering care; the Board’s brief merely asserted that that responsibility was ‘‘simply an aspect of their performance of their professional
55 Brief of Petitioner/Cross–Respondent Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. at 46
[hereinafter KRCC Brief] (quoting Health Care & Ret. Corp. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1260
(6th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 511 U.S. 571 (1994)). See also Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross–
Respondent Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., at 19 [hereinafter KRCC Reply Brief]
(citing Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997)).
56 825 F.2d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1987), cited in KRCC Brief at 39 and in KRCC Reply
Brief at 12.
57

Brief for the NLRB, at 3–4.
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duties.’’ The agency’s brief made no mention of the burden of proof
issue.
The Sixth Circuit heard oral argument on November 5, 1998.
Michael Hawkins argued for KRCC, Daniel J. Michalski argued on behalf
of the NLRB, and Tom Schulz argued for the union. Almost a year later,
the court issued a split decision.58 The majority overturned the holding
that the RNs were covered employees, while enforcing the remainder of
the NLRB order directing the employer to recognize and bargain with
the union on behalf of the non-professional employees and the rehabilitation counselors. KRCC succeeded in its strategy of mobilizing the court’s
festering irritation with the Board for exercising its right to adhere to
the agency’s own interpretation of the Act, contrary to that adopted by
the circuit. After castigating the Board for placing the burden of proof of
supervisory status on the employer, the court found that the RNs had, as
to administration of medication, authority to responsibly direct in the
exercise of independent judgment the LPNs, who had become three in
number based on a non-factual assertion in the KRCC brief. As building
supervisor, the court found, the RNs were the highest ranking staff
member on the premises, with authority to ‘‘seek additional employees
in the event of a staffing shortage, move employees between units as
needed, and TTT write up employees who do not cooperate with staffing
assignments.’’ The latter finding, without evidentiary explanation, ignored the contrary evidence credited by the Regional Director. The
majority had rejected the Board’s construction of ‘‘independent judgment’’ as contrary to circuit precedent and as unworthy of judicial
deference because the agency, according to the court, applied it manipulatively. Applying Sixth Circuit case law, the court held that these forms
of authority were sufficient to render the RNs § 2(11) supervisors.
Dissenting as to the nurses, Judge Nathaniel R. Jones would have
deferred to the Board’s factfinding, which he found had substantial
support on the record as a whole.
The Supreme Court Decision
On May 12, 2000, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari.59 The decision to seek certiorari was hotly debated within the
58

193 F.3d 444, 454 (6th Cir. 1999).

59 The description of proceedings in the Supreme Court is based upon telephone
interviews with Hawkins, Schulz, Carpenters Union Supreme Court counsel and AFL–CIO
Associate General Counsel Becker, AFL–CIO Associate General Counsel Coppess, former
Member Fox, former NLRB General Counsel Feinstein, former NLRB General Counsel
Page, and NLRB Associate General Counsel Ferguson, as well as the Supreme Court docket
sheet, and the briefs and other filings in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.,
Supreme Court Case No. 98–1815. The docket sheet and joint appendix are available on
microfilm. The transcript of the oral argument and the NLRB’s briefs are available at
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NLRB. The agency has sought certiorari in very few cases over the past
twenty years. At almost the same time as it decided Kentucky River, the
same Sixth Circuit panel decided another nurse supervisor case, Integrated Health Services of Michigan, at Riverbend, Inc. v. NLRB,60 a nursing
home case in which Judge Jones had filed a concurrence. The government could have sought certiorari in either of these cases, or in one from
another circuit, or awaited a better case from the Sixth.
Kentucky River was in several respects an atypical nurse supervisory
status case, making the choice of it for Supreme Court review an odd
one. The case is set in a psychiatric facility rather than the more typical
hospital or nursing home. As the employer had unsuccessfully argued
before the Sixth Circuit, the relationship of the rehabilitation counselors
to the rehabilitation assistants somewhat paralleled that of the RN or
LPN to nurses aides or certified nursing assistants in the hospital or
nursing home. The RNs at Caney Creek, by contrast, exercised little
authority to responsibly direct others in the performance of patient care
tasks, and there were no nurses aides. Despite a modicum of evidence
about the RNs directing an LPN in the administration of medications,
the weight of the circuit court’s conclusion that the Kentucky River RNs
were supervisors was based on their building supervisor role, a role
almost wholly independent of their professional skills and judgment. If
the employer had not been required to have an RN on duty at all times,
it might well have designated one of the rehabilitation assistants on each
shift to the role, which would have altered the complexion of the
supervisory status argument. The building supervisor role, moreover,
gave the employer the strong practical argument in favor of supervisory
status that when serving as building supervisor, the RNs were the
highest ranking staff member in the facility, and they filled this role for
long periods of time each week.
The General Counsel and the Board nevertheless concluded that
Kentucky River was the best case available. They wanted a case from the
Sixth Circuit because of its explicit attitude of non-deference to the
factfinding and statutory interpretation of the Board and because it was
the only circuit rejecting the NLRB’s allocation of the burden of proof.
As between the two Sixth Circuit decisions, Kentucky River presented
the better case for review. Integrated Health Services did not present
cleanly the ‘‘independent judgment’’ issue in the context of responsible
direction; there was too much evidence of disciplinary authority. A
Supreme Court decision upholding the Board’s position would not have
changed the result in Integrated Health Services, precluding satisfaction
¢http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme court/docket/2000/febdocket.html$. The remaining briefs of the parties and of amicus curiae are available on Lexis and Westlaw.
60
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of Supreme Court certiorari criteria. In Kentucky River, had the Court
accepted the Board’s § 2(11) independent judgment analysis along with
its allocation of the burden of proof, the RNs would not have been
deemed supervisors. The Jones dissent in Kentucky River was another
plus since it enhanced the credibility of the Board’s case before the
Supreme Court.
The tenor of Sixth Circuit case law also militated against waiting in
hopes of a more perfect certiorari vehicle. As NLRB General Counsel
Feinstein put it, the Sixth Circuit had invited employers to forum shop.
Major nursing home chains always have a location in the Sixth Circuit,
and therefore have the right to file their petitions for review of adverse
NLRB ULP decisions in that circuit, no matter the location of the
nursing home where the case arose. The effect was to give nearly
nationwide effect to the case law of that one circuit, contrary to that of
the Board. As Judge Jones had opined in his concurring opinion in
Integrated Health Services, the circuit had ‘‘become so entrenched in our
disagreements with the Board regarding the construction of § 2(11) that,
as a practical matter, we have made it impossible for nurses to form
bargaining units at nursing homes.’’61 The General Counsel and the
Board Members felt it imperative to obtain a Supreme Court ruling on
the construction of ‘‘independent judgment’’ in the health care industry
as well as on the allocation of the burden of proof of supervisory status.
Those most actively involved in the decision thought the Board
would win in the Supreme Court. Others in the agency, however, were
more pessimistic, as were AFL–CIO lawyers who had been working with
union counsel on many nurse supervisor cases at the circuit court level.
Nevertheless, the General Counsel and the Board urged the Solicitor
General, who had the final decision, to seek certiorari in Kentucky River,
and the Solicitor General did so.
The Board sought Supreme Court review on three questions: (1) the
Board’s construction of ‘‘independent judgment’’ in § 2(11) as not encompassing ‘‘an employee’s exercise of ordinary professional or technical
judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards’’; (2) the propriety of the
NLRB’s allocation of the burden of proof to the party alleging an
individual to be a supervisor, whether in a representation proceeding or
a ULP case; and (3) whether in applying its interpretation of § 2(11)
‘‘independent judgment’’ and its allocation of the burden of proof, the
NLRB reasonably found the RNs to be employees rather than supervisors. The Carpenters Union had not joined in the petition, or responded
to it, because it could not afford to take the case to the Supreme Court.
However, once the Board had petitioned, to the delight of the Carpen61

Id. at 713 (Jones, J. concurring).
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ters, the AFL–CIO stepped in. Its lawyers wrote the Carpenters Union’s
response in support of granting certiorari and later, wrote the brief on
the merits. The AFL–CIO had a much broader interest in the case than
the Carpenters Union, because of the impact of the nurses issue on many
AFL–CIO affiliate unions. KRCC counsel Hawkins also opposed certiorari. He accused the NLRB of picking on a small, poor employer as a weak
opposing litigant in choosing the case for certiorari. Hawkins later
explained that his client had not wished to expend its meager resources
on Supreme Court litigation. On September 26, 2000, the Court granted
the writ.
The NLRB’s main brief was largely divorced from the evidence.
Most of the brief was devoted to arguing that in light of HCR, ‘‘independent judgment’’ was ambiguous, hence the Board’s interpretation was
entitled to deference because it was rational and consistent with the Act.
The Board presented the Providence Hospital analysis as its controlling
interpretation of ‘‘independent judgment’’: ‘‘an employee does not exercise the ‘independent judgment’ that triggers supervisory status TTT
when the employee exercises ordinary professional or technical judgment
in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with
employer-specified standards.’’ The Regional Director’s decision on the
Kentucky River RNs was erroneously characterized as flowing straightforwardly from application of that test, and many of the facts were
rearranged to fit more appropriately within the schema of professional
direction of less skilled employees. The RNs were said to ‘‘work with and
occasionally direct less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with the employer-specified standards expressed in the treatment
plans,’’ a neat application of the Providence Hospital rule to a hypothetical Caney Creek which differed significantly from the one portrayed in
the representation proceeding. The treatment plans at Caney Creek were
overwhelmingly aimed at mental and social rehabilitation programs
designed by the rehabilitation counselors, and performed by them and by
the rehabilitation assistants; the nurses’ role in connection with the
treatment plans was almost entirely limited to medication monitoring
and administration, under physician guidance. Any direction regarding
performance of the treatment plans was done by the rehabilitation
counselors, whose employee status was no longer at issue. The NLRB
briefs also overstated the nurses’ working relationship with the rehabilitation assistants: ‘‘the RNs perform hands-on medical treatment and
give limited direction to other members of their teams, based on their
experience and special competence, pursuant to the requirements of the
residents’ treatment plans.’’62 The Caney Creek RNs had no teams.
62
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The NLRB’s briefs handled the facts very poorly, at several key
points accepting the employer’s or the Sixth Circuit’s version rather
than the conflicting evidence upon which the Regional Director had
relied. For example, in the NLRB’s brief, there were three LPNs working
at Caney Creek, ‘‘the RNs and LPNs provide medical services to residents throughout the [residential] units,’’ and ‘‘two RNs and one LPN
generally work on each of the three shifts, TTT although occasionally only
one RN works on the third shift.’’ Aside from the fact that, as of the
hearing, only one LPN position was filled, this text made it sound as
though at all times, two RNs and one LPN were on duty together.
Instead, they were spread across seven days a week of the particular
shift, so that usually only two out of the three nurses would be on the
job at the same time; with only one LPN on the payroll as of the hearing,
most of the time, the RNs each worked alone. When part of the
supervisory status claim is that the RNs supervised the LPNs in administering medications, it is important that most of the time each RN
worked there was no LPN on duty to ‘‘responsibly direct.’’ The NLRB
briefs confused the several building supervisor memos, citing as authoritative one that the Regional Director did not find to have been disseminated. This was compounded by the brief then weakly stating that there
was no evidence that any building supervisor had actually exercised the
authority conferred by that memo to ‘‘write up’’ a worker refusing to
work overtime in the event of staff shortage. In fact, as noted above,
Nurse Anderson had been reprimanded the only time she ever kept a
worker over without prior management authorization.
The employer’s brief treated the facts conclusorily ‘‘found’’ by the
Sixth Circuit, as well as those repeated from its Sixth Circuit brief, as
though they were uncontradicted in the record, and again leaned heavily
on the lack of any other supervisor on the premises during building
supervisor hours. It persuasively picked up on a view the HCR majority
had expressed in connection with ‘‘in the interest of the employer’’:
KRCC argued that the Board’s effort to separate out professional judgment from independent judgment would have the effect of precluding a
finding of supervisory status whenever the supervisory authority was
exercised on the basis of the individual’s professional training and
expertise, unless it involved a change in the employee’s status such as
promotion, discipline or discharge. KRCC argued that under the Board’s
construction of ‘‘independent judgment,’’ all professionals would be
employees, and none would be supervisors, no matter how much managerial and personnel authority they exercised over other workers. In its
reply brief, the Board reversed the argument, contending that on
KRCC’s construction, all professionals would be supervisors, and none
would be covered employees.
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KRCC made a fall-back argument which the NLRB did not parallel.
KRCC argued that even under the NLRB’s construction of ‘‘independent
judgment,’’ the RNs were supervisors, but it relied for this point on
evidence that had been contested and not credited by the Regional
Director, particularly the building supervisor memoranda. The NLRB,
on the other hand, did not bother to argue that, if the agency’s analysis
of ‘‘independent judgment’’ were rejected by the Court, the record was
nevertheless sufficient to support the Regional Director’s conclusion that
they lacked supervisory status. With better marshalling of the record,
the Board could have argued that the RNs’ direction of LPNs and
rehabilitation assistants was de minimis, as was their discretion when
operating within the building supervisor role, falling far below any
threshold for ‘‘responsible direction,’’ as well as ‘‘independent judgment.’’
The union briefs partially compensated for the deficiencies of the
NLRB briefs by meticulously detailing the evidence, linking the facts in
the record with the Board’s entitlement to deferential review on its
factfinding, and point by point, highlighting the many liberties the
KRCC brief took in its characterization of the evidence. The union briefs
also provided greater clarity than the Board’s about the distinction the
NLRB drew between occupational discretion and judgment, on the one
hand, and supervisory independent judgment, on the other. The former,
the union explained, is the judgment a professional, technical or skilled
employee must exercise in carrying out her own work responsibilities. If
one imagines a highly skilled worker performing an assignment without
any assistance from another worker, judgment the highly skilled worker
exercises is of necessity professional or occupational rather than supervisory, since there are no personnel functions involved. The latter is
discretion in the decision about delegating particular tasks to less skilled
workers, or about the selection of one particular worker rather than
another to perform a given task.
At the oral argument on February 21, 2001, Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence G. Wallace argued first, on behalf of the NLRB, and Michael
W. Hawkins argued on behalf of the employer. The NLRB did not split
time with the union intervenor. Early in the argument, one of the
justices successfully pressed Wallace to concede that the case was limited
to construction of ‘‘independent judgment,’’ and did not include interpretation of ‘‘responsibly to direct.’’ Wallace focused his presentation
almost entirely on the Board’s ‘‘independent judgment’’ test distinguishing ‘‘professional judgment,’’ a distinction several justices found confusing if not incoherent. When asked questions about key facts, he became
confused, and vacillated. Several times in the argument Wallace failed to
make clear to the justices the strongest facts in the record that supported the Board’s conclusions and the places in which the Sixth Circuit
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had misstated the record or rejected the Board’s factual findings even
though supported by substantial evidence. KRCC counsel Hawkins
pressed hard on the danger to institutionalized patients if the highest
level employee on duty for ten hours at night was not a supervisor with
undivided loyalty to the employer. There was no discussion at all during
the argument about the burden of proof issue. The NLRB and union
attorneys at the argument left discouraged about the chances of a
favorable opinion; Hawkins and employer attorneys left elated.
Hawkins later remarked on how abstract and policy-oriented the
Court’s focus was during oral argument. The Carpenters Union counsel
Schulz expressed a similar view, and also was trenchantly critical of
Wallace’s performance. In Schulz’s recollection, Wallace had been
so totally focused on whether the Board had the right ‘‘independent
judgment’’ standard, he never clearly argued that assuming the
Board was right, the employer had the burden of proof, and the
employer never proved supervisory status. Also, he failed to hone in
on the three key documents, [the three RN building supervisor
exhibits,] and that the Sixth Circuit in effect had overturned a
reasonable Board ruling on credibility as to whether the later ones
were real and actually in effect despite conflicting testimony. The
test of substantial evidence on the record as a whole should have
forced reversal of the Sixth Circuit on the RNs even if the Court had
remanded the case under a new standard. In addition, Wallace
should have argued the fallback position that the employer never
proved the supervisory status of the RNs under any standard. After
all, they were really arguing about ordinary supervisory authority
with respect to the building supervisor role, not anything unique to
professionals.
On May 29, 2001, the Supreme Court rendered a 5–4 decision in
Kentucky River.63 The majority, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected
the NLRB’s new formulation for § 2(11) status, although it unanimously
affirmed the Board’s allocation of the burden of proof to the party
claiming that the worker is a supervisor. The Court conceded, on the
basis of its reasoning in HCR, that the term ‘‘independent judgment’’
was indeed ambiguous, hence the NLRB was entitled to judicial deference in its construction, so long as it was rational and consistent with
the statute. However, according to the Court, the Board’s interpretation
was neither, hence it was ‘‘unlawful.’’
The predicate for the Court’s analysis was its reasoning about the
nature of the ambiguity in the term ‘‘independent judgment.’’ The
Board’s formula for independent judgment, and its brief outlining its
63 532 U.S. 706 (2001). All quotes in this and following paragraphs are from the
opinion.
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interpretation, had straddled the question of whether the agency was
arguing about a distinction based on quality or quantity; in effect, it was
arguing for both. The NLRB used ‘‘independent judgment’’ to differentiate between direction of coworkers based on professional or technical
judgment, as opposed to judgment based on personnel factors, while also
including a quantitative aspect, based on how broad a range of discretion
was conferred upon the putative supervisor. The Supreme Court, however, held that ‘‘independent judgment,’’ particularly as distinguished in
§ 2(11) from ‘‘activity routine or clerical in nature’’ was ambiguous as to
the minimum degree or scope of discretion required to render the
judgment ‘‘independent’’ rather than ‘‘routine,’’ but that the phrase left
no room for differentiation based on the nature, quality, or source of the
judgment. Introduction of differentiation based on the nature of the
judgment as professional or technical inserted a ‘‘categorical exclusion’’
into statutory text whose plain meaning suggests only one of degree
rather than kind. Moreover, much as it had in HCR, the Kentucky River
Court feared this distinction would permit the Board to deem to be
covered employees many workers exercising broad human resources
discretion over coworkers, asking ‘‘[w]hat supervisory judgment worth
exercising TTT does not rest on ‘professional or technical skill or experience?’ ’’
In addition, as the Court understood it, the Board’s ‘‘independent
judgment’’ analysis was effectively limited to ‘‘responsibly to direct.’’
The Court was particularly impatient with this error in statutory construction. It regarded the Board, in developing its formulation, as having
ignored the Court’s teaching in HCR, that ‘‘in the interest’’ required a
construction applicable to all twelve § 2(11) supervisory functions, a
syntax-based analysis just as relevant to ‘‘independent judgment.’’ The
Court accused the Board once again, as in HCR, of having in effect ‘‘read
the responsible direction portion of § 2(11) out of the statute in nurse
cases.’’ The Court characterized the Board’s interpretation of the interrelation of § 2(11) and § 2(12) as an argument that the § 2(12) policy
of coverage of professionals supports the ‘‘categorical exclusion of professional judgments’’ from ‘‘independent judgment.’’ Such an interpretation of ‘‘independent judgment’’ restricted to its use to limit ‘‘responsible direction,’’ the majority concluded, ‘‘contradict[s] both the text and
structure of the statute, TTT as well [as] the rule of [HCR] that the test
for supervisory status applies no differently to professionals than to
other employees.’’64
The majority rejected the Board’s construction of ‘‘independent
judgment’’ but not its underlying policy-based reasoning that the express
64 Id. at 715, 717, 720–21 (quoting NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S.
571, 579–80 (1994)).
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inclusion of professionals in § 2(12) supported interpretation of § 2(11)
so as to avoid their wholesale elimination as supervisors. Similarly, the
Court did not dispute the propriety of the Board’s reliance on Taft–
Hartley Act legislative history emphasizing Congress’ intent only to
exclude ‘‘true supervisors’’ with ‘‘genuine management authority’’ but
not ‘‘minor supervisors.’’ Conceding that ‘‘the Board is entitled to judge
[the soundness of its labor policy] without our constant second-guessing,’’ the Court reasoned that ‘‘[t]he problem with the argument is not
with the soundness of its labor policy TTT [but] that the policy cannot be
given effect through this statutory text.’’ The majority suggested that
the Board instead might be able to limit the scope of the supervisory
exclusion in responsible direction cases by ‘‘distinguishing employees
who direct the manner of others’ performance of discrete tasks from
employees who direct other employees, as § [2(11)] requires,’’ noting
that some NLRB case law had already drawn that distinction. Because
the Board had ‘‘carefully insisted that the proper interpretation of
‘responsibly to direct’ [was] not at issue,’’ however, the Court declined to
consider this alternative.
The NLRB did win a victory on its other major issue. The Court
unanimously held that the Sixth Circuit erred in not deferring to the
Board’s allocation of the burden of proof. Allocating the burden, both in
representation cases and in ULPs, to the party advocating a special
exclusion from a statutory prohibition, the Court reasoned, follows the
general rule of statutory construction. In addition, it is easier to demonstrate that an employee has one of the twelve § 2(11) supervisory
functions than to disprove that the employee has any of the twelve. The
Court also rejected the employer’s and the Sixth Circuit’s position that
in technical § 8(a)(5) cases the NLRB General Counsel nevertheless
should bear the burden of proof because the validity of the bargaining
unit is an element of the case. Disproving supervisory status, the Court
held, is not an element of the ULP. Rather, the General Counsel must
only prove that the unit was properly certified, which it was unless the
employer successfully bore its original burden of proof, in the earlier
representation proceeding, of the supervisory status of the RNs.
One might have expected the Court to remand the case to the Sixth
Circuit for reconsideration under the correct burden of proof, but it did
not. The Board’s error in construing ‘‘independent judgment’’ prevented
the Court from enforcing the NLRB order as to the RNs, and the Court
held that it could not enforce the agency’s order by substituting a legal
standard of its own devising, which the Board had in any event not
asked the Court to do. Thus far, the reasoning is uncontroversial. The
decision goes on, however, to point out that under similar conditions in
HCR, the Court simply affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, and
‘‘since neither party has suggested that [HCR’s] method for determining

390

KENTUCKY RIVER

the propriety of a remand should not apply here, we take the same
course.’’ The affirmance of the circuit court left its judgment standing,
meaning the employer was ordered to bargain as to the wall-to-wall
bargaining unit, excluding the RNs. Both KRCC counsel Hawkins and
Union counsel Schulz found this portion of the Court’s reasoning mystifying.
The Kentucky River majority opinion was almost entirely divorced
from the facts of the case. The Supreme Court quotes the lower court’s
opinion as though it accurately described the facts in stating ‘‘that the
Board had erred by classifying ‘the practice of a nurse supervising a
nurse’s aide in administering patient care’ as ‘routine [simply] because
the nurses have the ability to direct patient care by virtue of their
training and expertise, not because of their connection with management.’ ’’65 Of course, there were no nurses aides at Caney Creek, so the
nurses could not have been supervisors in directing employees who did
not exist. Elsewhere, the Court characterized the Board’s interpretation
of ‘‘independent judgment’’ as ‘‘[t]he only basis asserted by the Board,
before the Court of Appeals and here, for rejecting respondent’s proof of
supervisory status with respect to directing patient care.’’ Yet the
reasoning below turned very little on RN direction of patient care, as
opposed to their building supervisor role, a role nearly totally divorced
from the professional judgment aspect of the NLRB’s ‘‘independent
judgment’’ analysis. This error, as well as the Court’s failure to remand
the case, shows that it handled the case as though it were simply
reviewing an NLRB rule adopted through a rulemaking process. The
Court ignored the fact that this was a case in which the effect of its
holding was to deprive six registered nurses of rights as employees under
the NLRA, when what it should have done was to remand the case to
have their employee status litigated under a properly allocated burden of
proof. All nine justices found that the court of appeals misallocated the
burden of proof. Had the case been remanded to fix that error, the
results for the RNs might have been different.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
dissented on the holding regarding RN status. The dissenters insisted
that the § 2(11) terms ‘‘independent judgment’’ and ‘‘responsibly to
direct’’ are ‘‘quintessential examples of terms that the expert agency
should be allowed to interpret in light of the policies animating the
statute.’’ The NLRB’s reading, asserted Justice Stevens, provided a
definition of supervisor that, unlike the majority’s, would not completely
eliminate the coverage of professionals. The dissent defended the Board’s
distinction between the judgment that nurses exercise when asking
others to take a patient’s temperature and the judgment that nurses
65

Id. at 710 (quoting 193 F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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exercise when they discipline others. In the dissent’s view, the Board was
correct in concluding that the exercise of independent judgment should
mean one thing when it modified the ambiguous term ‘‘responsibly to
direct’’ and something else when it modified the unambiguous terms in
the other § 2(11) supervisory functions, such as ‘‘promote’’ or ‘‘discharge.’’ The Board’s reading was correct because only the term ‘‘responsibly to direct’’ was ambiguous and only it was ‘‘capable of swallowing’’ the statutory inclusion of professionals ‘‘if not narrowly construed.’’
The dissent also pointed out the irony of the majority’s conclusion that
the RNs, who had no subordinates, were supervisors while leaving
untouched the Board’s conclusion that the rehabilitation counselors, who
did routinely direct activities of the rehabilitation assistants, were not
supervisors. Finally, the dissent maintained that since the Court had
unanimously concluded that the Sixth Circuit had applied the wrong
burden of proof, it should not have affirmed the lower court’s judgment,
but instead remanded for the lower court to apply the correct standard.
The majority’s main holding effectively sends the NLRB back to the
drawing board to interpret § 2(11). The decision leaves the Board with
only four clear guidelines for its future construction of § 2(11) ‘‘independent judgment.’’ First, it cannot use that phrase to differentiate based on
the nature or quality of the judgment. Second, it can set a reasonable
threshold or minimum quantity, degree or scope of discretion as requisite for the judgment to be ‘‘independent.’’ Third, the Court accepted the
tail end of the NLRB’s Providence Hospital formulation; ‘‘the degree of
judgment TTT may be reduced below the statutory threshold by detailed
orders and regulations issued by the employer.’’66 Fourth, the Board
should carefully ensure that the interpretation it places on ‘‘independent
judgment’’ applies identically, across-the-board, to all twelve forms of
§ 2(11) supervisory authority. Apart from these points, however, the
decision shines a hazy light on a possible interpretation of ‘‘responsibly
to direct’’ as requiring more than assignment of discrete tasks.
HCR has ruled out ‘‘in the interest of the employer’’ as a means to
resolve the tension between professional and supervisory status. Kentucky River has ruled out the use of ‘‘independent judgment’’ in terms of
the qualitative nature of the judgment, or its source in professional,
technical or skilled craft knowledge rather than personnel management.
The Court has, however, left open the prospect of a minimum threshold
of discretion in managing other workers being required, as well as the
possibility of interpretation of ‘‘responsibly to direct’’ and ‘‘assign’’
which might accomplish much the same accommodation of coverage of
professional employees as the Board’s earlier formula for ‘‘in the interest
of the employer’’ and ‘‘independent judgment.’’ On the other hand,
66

Id. at 713–14.
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similar dicta in Yeshiva lured the Board onto the rocks in HCR and
similar dicta in HCR led the Board to run aground in Kentucky River.
This new invitation holds great promise of sending the NLRB over
Niagara Falls in a barrel, taking with it the NLRA rights of professionals
and perhaps also many technical and skilled trades employees.
The Immediate Impact of NLRB v. Kentucky River
The decision in Kentucky River had important consequences—for
the Caney Creek employees, for nurses around the country seeking to
organize, and for those with union representation attempting to continue collective bargaining. The ripples have rapidly spread to other professions, as well as to borderline supervisors in manufacturing and service
industries. Most directly, the end of the story for the parties in Kentucky
River is that, except for the RNs, the employees finally won their
bargaining rights.67 Although the Supreme Court litigation delayed the
commencement of bargaining for about two years, it is unclear to what
extent this additional delay altered the course of contract negotiations. It
is doubtful whether the decision to exclude the RNs from the unit has
made much difference, since their inclusion would have only very modestly increased the union’s bargaining leverage with the employer.
Ironically, the failure to remand, although depriving the union of the
chance to argue that the employer failed to carry its burden of proving
the RNs to be supervisors under a revamped NLRB standard for ‘‘independent judgment,’’ benefitted the rest of the unit. It moved the case to
closure, with an order to bargain covering ninety-five percent of the
requested positions for the bargaining unit. The employer then abandoned its open resistance to union representation. The war for entrenchment of the union as bargaining agent, and negotiation and implementation of a collective bargaining agreement, on the other hand, continues.
As of early 2005, no labor contract had been reached, and the prospects
for one have become increasingly remote.
The § 8(a)(3) charges regarding the discharge of Glenn Moore and a
few other workers during the election campaign dragged on throughout
the litigation up to the Supreme Court and thereafter. The cases were all
settled in the end. Moore won a substantial settlement, but had to agree
to waive reinstatement. For a while Moore went to work for his father,
then he drifted around for a period and moved on. Moore’s departure, as
well as a large layoff and turnover among the workforce, has contributed
to the erosion of the union’s support at Caney Creek. Some of the
rehabilitation counselors spearheaded a failed effort at decertification a
year or two after the employer commenced bargaining with the Carpenters. The union has found itself trapped in a no man’s land, in which the
67 Telephone Interview with union counsel Thomas Schulz, October 1, 2004; Telephone
Interview with KRCC counsel Michael Hawkins, January 13, 2005.
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opponents of union representation lack sufficient support to decertify,
but the union lacks enough hard core support to exert serious economic
pressure on KRCC through a strike, picket line, or other job action that
might bring labor contract talks to a conclusion. Exacerbating the
union’s weakness is the reluctance of the rehabilitation assistants and
counselors to take any job action that might jeopardize patient care and
progress. Dinsmore & Shohl continued to handle the contract negotiations for the employer for about a year after the Supreme Court decision.
Since then, KRCC CEO Dr. Louise Howell and other in-house staff have
handled the employer’s negotiations, although from time to time, they
continue to consult Hawkins. Schulz regards Dr. Howell as a ‘‘tough
negotiator.’’
The Continuing Importance of Kentucky River Today
The broader story of NLRB construction of § 2(11) likewise has not
reached closure. The aftermath at the NLRB might best be described as
‘‘deja vu all over again.’’ On July 23, 2003, a Board now composed
predominantly of Bush administration appointees issued a notice inviting the filing of briefs by parties and interested amici in three representation cases, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota,
Inc. (Golden Crest Healthcare Center), and Croft Metals, Inc.68 These
cases, one involving a hospital, one a nursing home, and one a manufacturing plant, are to be the vehicle through which the Board will attempt,
yet again, to resolve how to interpret § 2(11), this time within the
constraints of Kentucky River. Major employer organizations, the AFL–
CIO and many major unions filed briefs, as did the NLRB General
Counsel.69 A General Counsel Memorandum instructs regional staff, both
in handling ULP cases and when presiding in representation cases, to
ensure a full factual record on these issues.70
The Board’s notice invites suggestions about the gamut of postKentucky River issues. Following directly from the Supreme Court’s
reasoning, it asks where to set the minimum ‘‘degree’’ or ‘‘scope of
68 Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., NLRB Case No. 7–
RC–22141; Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota, Inc., d/b/a Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., Cases
18–RC–16415, 18–RC–16416; Croft Metals, Inc., Case 15–RC–8393, July 25, 2003,
¢www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/kyriver.pdf$.
69 Brief of the General Counsel, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., NLRB Case No. 7–RC–
22141; Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota, Inc., d/b/a Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., Cases 18–
RC–16415, 18–RC–16416; Croft Metals, Inc., Case 15–RC–8393, reprinted as attachment to
Evidentiary Guidelines for Determining Supervisory Status, GC Memorandum OM 04–09,
Oct. 31, 2003, available at ¢http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared files/ommemo/ommemo$.
70 Evidentiary Guidelines for Determining Supervisory Status, GC Memorandum OM
04–09, Oct. 31, 2003, available at ¢http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared files/ommemo/ommemo$.
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discretion’’ for § 2(11) ‘‘independent judgment’’; how to define ‘‘responsibly,’’ in ‘‘responsibly to direct’’; how to differentiate or address the
overlap between ‘‘assign’’ and ‘‘direct,’’ and how one can intelligibly
distinguish between directing other employees and directing the manner
in which others perform discrete tasks. The notice also requests views on
additional fundamental issues of statutory construction, including how
to resolve the tension between § 2(11)’s exclusion of supervisors and
§ 2(12)’s inclusion of professionals, whether a viable distinction can be
drawn between § 2(11) ‘‘independent judgment’’ and § 2(12) ‘‘discretion
and judgment,’’ and whether there are identifiable functions which can
serve as points of demarcation to differentiate, in Congress’ words,
between true supervisors possessing ‘‘genuine management prerogatives,’’ and ‘‘minor supervisory employees.’’ In reconciling the supervisory exclusion with the professional inclusion, the notice specifically asks,
‘‘[d]oes the Act contemplate a situation in which an entire group of
professional workers may be deemed supervisors, based on their role
with respect to less-skilled workers?’’ In addition, responders are asked
to address an employer’s ability to rotate, alternate, or divide up supervisory functions among its workforce, so as to exclude the great majority of
workers as statutory supervisors, or to devolve those functions to collective decisionmaking by self-regulating work teams. The final question
seeks advice on the extent to which the Board should continue to take
into account in supervisory status determinations the so-called ‘‘secondary indicia’’ such as ratio of supervisors to subordinates and proportion
of time spent performing rank and file work by putative supervisors.
These indicators are labeled ‘‘secondary’’ because they do not appear in
the text of § 2(11), yet they have functioned as powerful markers, or as
the General Counsel’s brief suggested, ‘‘circumstantial evidence’’ regarding the actual allocation of authority within a workplace, an important
brake on manipulation of job content by employers to exclude many
ordinary workers as supervisors.
In the meantime, Kentucky River has sharply affected union organizing and collective bargaining, especially among nurses and other
health care workers. Employers have been emboldened to seek to exclude
from NLRB rights entire existing as well as proposed bargaining units of
staff nurses, sometimes on grounds of their professional task delegation
to nursing aides or technicians and sometimes on the basis that the
nurses rotate through or occasionally serve as substitutes in the position
of charge nurse. One health care employer has deemed guard leaders
working with two or three other guards to be supervisors and an
automotive parts manufacturer has challenged as supervisory the team
leaders of its self-directed production teams.71 Aided by the Kentucky
71 Decision and Direction of Election, Providence Everett Med. Ctr., Case 19–RC–14157
(Nov. 29, 2001) (leader security guards); Decision and Direction of Election, Borg Warner
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River holding that the proponent of supervisory status bears the burden
of proving it, unions continue to win favorable regional director decisions
in about nine out of ten representation cases in which the employer
seeks to exclude hospital or nursing home nurses as § 2(11) supervisors.
However, since Kentucky River, employers have been filing requests for
review in many of these cases. As of December 2004, one AFL–CIO
lawyer estimated that there were over thirty pending before the NLRB,
awaiting disposition of Oakwood and Golden Crest, in addition to those
before the courts of appeals.
Kentucky River precludes the Board from interpreting ‘‘independent
judgment’’ to differentiate based on the quality or nature of the judgment, but invites the Board to define the term by setting a minimum
threshold of discretion which it would require the putative supervisor to
have in the performance of at least one § 2(11) function before it would
attach the ‘‘independent judgment’’ label. It also suggests that one
permissible construction that might reconcile § 2(11) with the coverage
of professionals in § 2(12) would be to treat direction of discrete tasks as
insufficient to qualify as ‘‘responsible direction,’’ requiring instead that
the worker ‘‘responsibly direct’’ other employees in their overall work.
This has reopened, rather than settled, the issue of where and how to
draw the line between ‘‘employees’’ and ‘‘supervisors,’’ putting into
question nearly all established Board case law on all but the most clearcut bosses, on the one hand, and laborers, on the other. At the least, it
will entail a change in the Board’s analytical methodology, if not a
change in outcomes. Moreover, because the Court has insisted that the
Board may not devise a construction of § 2(11) that explicitly treats
professionals differently from other employees, future cases construing
§ 2(11) will affect not only professionals and technicals, but also skilled
trades workers directing apprentices and helpers, and leaders and machine set-up employees directing production employees.
When Taft–Hartley was enacted, it is highly improbable that Congress had any idea that its last-minute addition of ‘‘responsibly to
(Morse Tec, Inc.), (Case 17–RC–12183) (May 21, 2003) (team leaders of self-directed work
teams); Decision and Direction of Election, HMR of Maryland, LLC, Case 5–RC–15444
(Sept. 13, 2002) (entire proposed RN and LPN bargaining unit, where nurses rotated
through charge nurse positions); Decision and Direction of Election, Gordon Health
Ventures, 6–RC–12195 (Mar. 25, 2003) (entire six RN and LPN bargaining unit on grounds
that they served as shift supervisor/charge nurses with authority over the nursing assistants); Decision and Direction of Election, Hosp. Gen. Menonita, Inc., Case 9–RC–17602
(Feb. 21, 2002) (all eighty members of proposed RN staff nurse bargaining unit because of
role utilizing technicians, LPNs and service personnel in patient care); Decision and Order,
Integrated Health Servs., Inc., Case 6–UC–445 (Dec. 19, 2002) (petition for clarification of
ten-year-old all-LPN bargaining unit effectively to eliminate entire unit based on LPNs’
role directing CNAs). All these decisions are available at ¢http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions$.
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direct’’ to the list of twelve § 2(11) functions might lead to interpretation of the supervisory exclusion as encompassing most professionals,
expressly covered in § 2(12) and § 9(b)(1), or the many skilled trades
workers who delegate and oversee work of trainees, given special bargaining unit rights in § 9(b)(2). When the statute is read as a whole,
such an interpretation would undermine effectuation of several provisions. It is clear from the legislative history that Congress had in mind
foremen charged with running entire departments or production lines.
The reports, statements, and speeches rarely refer to ‘‘supervisors,’’ but
rather, most of the time, to ‘‘foremen.’’ This is consistent with the
statement of Senator Flanders, who in proposing the insertion of ‘‘responsibly to direct’’ on the Senate floor said he merely wanted to ensure
that even where a personnel department ignored the foremen’s recommendations on discipline or pay increases too often for them to satisfy
the § 2(11) requirement that they be ‘‘effective recommendations,’’ a
foreman with authority and control to run an operation would still be a
statutory supervisor. Had Congress thought that provisions of the bill
effectively would repeal NLRA coverage for ordinary skilled trades
workers, because they delegate tasks to helpers and apprentices, the
political forces of the day, particularly the AFL craft union affiliates,
probably would have marshaled enough votes in Congress to block Taft–
Hartley, or at least they would have prevented the override of President
Truman’s veto. It is only when the pieces of § 2(11)—‘‘responsibly to
direct’’ and the other listed forms of authority, ‘‘in the interest of the
employer,’’ and ‘‘independent judgment’’—are dissected separately, extracted from their statutory and historical context, that one can conclude
the contrary.
AFL–CIO Associate General Counsel Craig Becker, now filing briefs
in the post-Kentucky River NLRB and court of appeals cases, summarized the situation: ‘‘As a legal matter it has been an interesting
exercise. There is a strong argument based on the legislative history that
Congress did not intend this group of workers to be excluded. However,
the statutory language does not lend itself to an easy effectuation of this
intent and the Board’s choice of means to effectuate that intent, moving
first from ‘in the interest of the employer,’ shifting then to ‘independent
judgment,’ was not necessarily the best possible.’’72
It remains to be seen whether yet another interpretative move
under § 2(11) will suffice to reconcile the statutory command favoring
inclusion of professionals with the command to exclude ‘‘true supervisors’’ to ensure employers the undivided loyalty of their representatives.
There is a substantial risk of yet another replay of HCR and Kentucky
River, whether the Board interprets ‘‘responsible direction’’ so as to
72

Telephone Interview with Craig Becker, December 17, 2004.
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exclude direction of ad hoc tasks, or shifts to an interpretation of
‘‘independent judgment’’ setting a fairly high quantum of discretion as a
threshold, or both. Moreover, whatever formula is adopted by the Board,
it is likely to influence personnel practices in areas starting with the
health care industry, but spreading far afield. Labor lawyers, industrial
relations practitioners, and personnel specialists will no doubt rethink
how they organize work and allocate functions, with an eye toward
influencing legal consequences.
In the center of this picture of broader labor relations consequences
is the plight of nurses, doctors, and other health care workers, and the
undoing of the congressional intent behind the 1974 health care amendments that brought the industry under NLRA jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court in HCR found the legislative history of these amendments to have
no value in interpreting § 2(11) because that provision had been enacted
by Congress twenty-seven years earlier. Nevertheless, the 1974 Congress
clearly thought it was covering employee RNs, LPNs, MDs, and other
health care professional and technical employees who, because of their
specialized jobs, routinely delegate tasks to less-skilled workers. Had it
believed otherwise, Congress might well have amended the definition of
employee in the statute to cover them specifically, as the American
Nurses Association had in fact requested. In 1974, the NLRA was
amended because recognition strikes were disrupting health care and
because low pay and poor working conditions for unorganized workers
were driving the brightest and most talented out of the field. As it
becomes progressively harder for nurses to organize, their pay and
conditions worsen and the nursing shortage continues to grow—exactly
the problems for the industry and for patients that Congress sought to
avoid. In its reasoning in both HCR and Kentucky River, the Supreme
Court tacitly assumes that by excluding such professional and technical
workers from the protections of the Act, the employer will have their
‘‘undivided loyalty’’ because they will lose the statutory right to organize
and bargain collectively. Depriving them of the right to organize does not
guarantee their loyalty, and it does not prevent them from taking
collective action—it merely moves the activity outside the regulation of
the NLRA, restoring the status quo ante 1974. A new wave of recognition strikes for excluded ‘‘supervisor’’ nurses in hospitals and nursing
homes could be the ultimate undoing of the goals of the 1974 legislation.
Conclusion
Unlike the typical NLRA organizing campaign story, in which the
employer’s allegedly unfair labor practices or objectionable campaign
activities take center stage, the Kentucky River story has focused on
structural issues of bargaining unit composition. The bargaining unit is
both an election district and a grouping for economic pressure tactics in
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the heat of collective bargaining. The inclusion or exclusion from the
protections of the Act of professional workers at the boundary line of
supervisory authority affects both elections and the union’s collective
bargaining power. For the workers involved in Kentucky River, the
union, the employer, and their trial counsel, the case was one focused on
factual issues determining who would be included in the bargaining unit,
hence whether the union would win the election and, ultimately, whether it could pressure the employer into a collective bargaining agreement.
For the agency’s lawyers, however, particularly at the appellate and
Supreme Court level, as well as for the AFL–CIO, the Kentucky River
story was mainly about technical legal issues and NLRB agency policy:
the correct formula for interpreting the supervisor definition while
preserving the right to organize and bargain for ordinary professional
employees. For employers such as KRCC, the issue was how to ensure
that the employer retains control over those workers representing it in
directing subordinates.
For scholars of labor law and industrial relations, the focus is
different still. Kentucky River flows through core structural questions
about the Act. It compels reexamination of questions regarding which
types of workers have rights of freedom of association and collective
bargaining and how large a percentage of the workforce can be excluded
from statutory coverage without rendering § 7 a hollow promise. In the
early days of the Wagner Act, the foremen’s unionization drives triggered a battle between those on the bottom and those on the top over
the loyalties of those in the middle. In transmuted form, the battle
continues today for the hearts and minds—and NLRA status—of workers who use skill and education to exercise judgment but who have little
control over coworkers. In the modern workplace, with flattened managerial hierarchies, and with managerial authority pushed downward to
the lowest possible level and distributed as widely as possible, a broad
construction of the § 2(11) factors could render nearly everyone a
supervisor excluded from employee status under the Act. Congress, the
Board, and the courts have struggled with where to draw the line since
the earliest days of the NLRA. They no doubt will continue to do so in an
ever-growing volume of cases triggered by new forms of work organization in the Bermuda Triangle established at the intersection of HCR and
Kentucky River.

